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Introduction
In an ideal world, inquiry into the efficiency of a legal regime would
require the collection and analysis of empirical information concerning costs
and benefits. But, due to cost constraints and limits on available means of
measurement, fact studies are the exception rather than the rule in law and
economics. Instead, legal policy debates respecting efficiency usually
deploy economic theories in the absence of determinative empirical evi-
dence. Efficiency emerges as presumption, not as fact. Absent data on
costs and benefits, legal policy debates must be resolved by allocating an
empirical burden of proof, with the party bearing the burden losing the
debate. Participants in such debates draw on the behavioral predictions of
economic theory as they search for ways to assure that the burden rests on
their opponents' shoulders.
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Economic models do not come ready-made with burden of proof
recommendations keyed to legal policy debates. The models must be tran-
slated and adjusted for legal contexts. Historically, these arbitrage exer-
cises have simplified the economics and caused the models to yield clear
regulatory or deregulatory policy signals. But as to some heavily traversed
subject matter, the passage of time has brought such an accumulation of
economic assertions that the presumptive regulatory signal has lost its
clarity. Such a mature literature, by virtue of its very complexity, is less
well suited to the sustenance of strong policy positions. Policy debates go
forward, but clarity of position follows less from the terms of economic
theory itself than from the employment of the ordinary tools of normative
lawyerly debate.
The law and economics of limited liability, with its succession of back-
and-forth arguments about the location of an efficiency presumption for and
against,' presents a literature of this sort. So when Allan Vestal asked us
to inquire into the efficiency implications of the recent proliferation of
limited liability company (LLC) statutes for this Symposium, we accepted
the invitation without making any projection about the exercise's probable
results. We hoped that the economic literature, upon de novo review,
would yield some new theoretical spin on limited liability - a spin that
would provide new advice as to the appropriate location of the legal pre-
sumption and that would redirect the back-and-forth legal debate. Unfortu-
nately, that hope was not fulfilled. The economics we reviewed offer new
theoretical perspectives on limited liability. But instead of sending a new
efficiency signal, these economics only further complicate the existing
picture. Upon concluding our review, we found ourselves in a position to
recommend only that the best presumption is that the present economics
support no presumption at all.
This Article reports on our encounter with the economics of limited
liability. Part I begins with a review of the back-and-forth debate on
limited liability in law and economics and the application of positions in
that debate to the LLC. This review observes that the proponents of the
LLC have grounded their claims for productivity enhancement on an
extremely thin theoretical base. The proponents' claims follow the view
first articulated more than a decade ago that limited liability fosters effi-
ciency by lowering the cost of shareholder monitoring, reducing the risk of
investment, and creating conditions for the free transferability of shares.
These effects of limited liability are said to permit shareholder portfolio
diversification that in turn prompts more productive investment policies
1. See infra notes 15-96 and accompanying text.
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629 (1997)
within firms. The thinness of this efficiency view becomes apparent when
reference is made to a contrasting law and economics theory - the pro rata
hypothesis. The pro rata hypothesis asserts that the problems of unlimited
liability can be solved if a pro rata liability regime is employed in place of
the joint and several liability regime manifested in current partnership law.
This hypothesis projects that, given a pro rata regime, efficiency gains will
result from stepped-up equityholder incentives to limit firms' suboptimal
risky investments. The pro rata view directly and strongly challenges all
standing justifications for limited liability for small firms. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, LLC proponents thus far have failed to address this hypothesis.
Part I goes on to report on our encounter with the economic literature.
This report claims that the story about capital and ownership structure
previously drawn on to claim efficiency effects for limited liability no
longer safely can be relied on as a matter of economic theory. We show
that the most basic notion behind the efficiency case - the idea that there
is a connection between a single firm ownership structure and the maximi-
zation of firm value - has become highly contestable. In the absence of
empirical verification, it may be unsafe to assume that a direct relationship
exists between a particular ownership structure and firm performance.
More specifically, some models show that an incentive device (such as
collateral) can provide a sufficient economic basis to align management
incentives and limit the effects of risky decisions.2 Other models show that
under certain conditions concentrated shareholding may have productivity
advantages. 3 Together, these models sharply controvert the assertion that
limited liability enhances productivity by discouraging concentration and by
encouraging diversification. Part I also considers the implications of the
assumption, made by both the efficiency and pro rata approaches, that
insurance is readily available to cover the risks taken by firms. This dis-
cussion asks some questions about the validity of this assumption, making
reference to recent literature on insurance's availability and effect.
Part II considers the second component of the LLC proponents' effi-
ciency case - the assertion that the economic theory of regulatory competi-
tion justifies the states' seriatim adoption of LLC statutes. Here, in contrast
to Part I, our encounter with the economics yields a definite result. We
assert as a general proposition that regulatory competition analysis cannot
plausibly be conducted on a black box basis that avoids inquiry into the
incentives of government actors. We use this perspective to show that,
although LLCs present a law as product situation, the classic race to the top
2. See infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
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story in which fifty states compete to supply cost-saving business forms to
an undifferentiated class of discriminating consumers does not fit the facts
of the case. A more plausible economic account of the enactment of LLC
statutes centers on a locally based supply and demand description and on
an interest group causation story. Given such an account, regulatory com-
petition theory provides no basis for an efficiency pronouncement in favor
of the LLC. We also show that regulatory competition theory does not
imply an affirmative inefficiency story. We consider and reject the sugges-
tion that the LLC amounts to a race to the bottom, finding that the applica-
tion of the downward model of regulatory competition is just as implausible
as the application of the upward, race to the top model.
Our regulatory competition analysis reaches definite conclusions only
to offer no help on the ultimate question - the appropriate location of an
efficiency presumption respecting the LLC. As to that issue, we make no
recommendation.
I. Limited Liability and Economic Efficiency
This Part begins with a review of the law and economics of limited
liability and its application to the LLC. We then situate some of the
economic concepts operative in this literature in the larger context of the
economic theory of the firm. We pursue a modest objective in so doing.
We do not, for example, purport to offer either a complete review of the
latter literature or a definitive statement of its bearing on the subject of
limited liability. We seek instead to show that some of the economic
assertions figuring prominently in the legal policy discussion are highly
contestable as a matter of economic theory. To the extent that we succeed,
we further complicate an already complex discourse.
A. The Limited Liability Company and the Law and
Economics of Limited Liability
An LLC bandwagon has rolled across the country. Since 1988, when
two states provided for this new business form,4 forty-six additional states
have enacted enabling statutes. Law practice in the field has matured
rapidly, aided by a prototype statute from the American Bar Association, 5
a model act from the Uniform Laws Commissioners, 6 and a comprehensive
4. We use the word "new" guardedly. The LLC is a first cousin of the historical joint
stock company. William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents,
66 U. COLO. L. REv. 855, 868-77 (1995).
5. PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT (1992).
6. UNIF. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT, 6A U.L.A. 425 (1995).- For criticism of
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Revenue Procedure from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).7 Most
observers agree on a simple explanation for this spontaneous expansion of
the menu of business forms: there is high demand for the LLC's combina-
tion of one-tier, partnership tax treatment,8 limited liability, and flexibility
respecting governance terms.9 The menu's antecedent means to the same
end - the Subchapter S Corporation and the limited partnership - now
appear in comparison to implicate excess complexity and excess cost.10
The LLC's development appears to improve the menu of business
forms in several ways. The LLC brings us to the final stage in the evolu-
tionary abandonment of the historical association of, on the one hand,
limited liability, corporate governance norms, and two-tier tax treatment,
and, on the other hand, unlimited liability, partnership governance norms,
and one-tier tax treatment. The substantive justifications for the bundling
of the former trio lost their force many years ago when limited liability,
quasi-partnership governance norms, and one-tier tax treatment became
available to actors who elected Subchapter S status and made full use of
close corporation provisions in state codes. Given the availability of one-
this statute, see Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws and
Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. CoLo. L. REV. 947 (1995).
7. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501.
8. The IRS's 1988 determination to accord flow-through tax treatment, Rev. Rul. 88-
76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, is a sine qua non. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited
Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW. 1, 4 (1995).
9. LLC statutes tend to allow members to choose between centralized and direct
member management.
10. Limitation of liability through the limited partnership form presupposes barriers to
the exercise of control by those participants enjoying the benefit of limited liability. See RE-
VISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT (1976) (RULPA) § 303, 6A U.L.A. 144 (1976).
The corporate form does not require such an arrangement. Parties may incorporate and
adopt special provisions that approximate the terms of partnership governance, such as
management at the shareholder level, restrictions on transfer of stock, and exit through buyout
or dissolution. Single-tier tax treatment can be achieved under Subchapter S, I.R.C. § 1361
(1988). The popularity of the LLC implies that the complexity of the planning required for
employment of these provisions has limited the number of businesses that opt for limited
liability. As Ribstein argues, given the imperfections of planning by contract, the background
of inappropriate corporate governance norms never recedes from significance. Ribstein, supra
note 8, at 2-3. The Subchapter S restrictions - as to the number of shareholders, capital
structure, and ownership interest in subsidiaries - also often are included on the list of
deterrents. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A)-(C); see also William L. Klein & Eric M. Zolt,
Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?,
66 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1001, 1004 (1995).
Forced to choose between the two disabling factors - state corporate law and federal
tax restrictions - we would choose the former. The Subchapter S restrictions do not operate
as constraints on many small businesses; but, the smaller the business, the larger the barrier
presented by complex planning supervised by an outside legal professional.
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tier tax treatment with limited liability to those willing to pay the extra layer
of transaction costs incurred in organizing a close corporation, it appears
arbitrary, even undemocratic," to withhold the benefit from those similarly
situated but unwilling to pay. 2 Corporate law has abandoned mandatory
imposition of its board-level, collective decisionmaking norm without con-
cern for the resulting expansion in the number of firms enjoying limited lia-
bility. 3 Thus, there appears to be no compelling reason against an expan-
sion of the menu of governance options available to firms doing business
under the shield of limited liability. 4 The list of factors that in an ideal
world would determine the availability of limited liability and the applica-
tion of one- and two-tier tax treatment is unlikely to include the actors'
preference for partnership as opposed to corporate governance norms.
Legal coherence, however, provides only a conditional basis for the
validation of business law practices. Today, the practices also must be
efficient. Unsurprisingly, the literature leaves open the empirical question
respecting the LLC's costs and benefits and addresses the matter only at a
theoretical level. Unfortunately, the theoretical literature takes a divided
stance, inviting replication of its back-and-forth arguments as discussion
goes forward respecting the LLC's presumptive efficiency.
1. Efficiency Theory
One line of theory, referred to here as efficiency theory, enunciates a
productivity argument strongly favorable to limited liability. The theory's
leading proponents, Easterbrook and Fischel, make the argument by de-
scribing the situation of the publicly held firm in a hypothetical regime of
11. See Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability,
Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 15 -56 (1992); see also Klein & Zolt,
supra note 10, at 1030-34.
12. Here we echo the argument of Klein and Zolt, who assert that the status quo makes
no sense as a tax policy proposition. They comment that it is surprising that investors can
elect between two significantly different tax regimes. They also find it peculiar that the
participants get to choose whether or not to enjoy limited liability. Klein & Zolt, supra note
10, at 1002. Although the wisdom of limited liability may be debatable, the liability shield
should not be connected to the choice of business form or the tax shield. 1d. at 1007. Klein
and Zolt also analyze the tax policy issues implicated by LLCs. See id. at 1006-07.
13. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q.
365, 378-88 (1992).
14. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law,
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 433, 451-52 (1995) (noting that theoretical questions about tort externalities
have not entered political processes that have produced LLC statutes); c Larry E. Ribstein,
Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REv. 80, 92-93 (1991) (arguing
that corporate law process mandates serve functions similar to those of control rules of limited
partnerships in that both rules discourage use of limited liability form of doing business).
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joint and several unlimited liability.15 Easterbrook and Fischel focus on the
firm's equity investors and project problems investors would encounter with
respect to monitoring, liquidity, and diversification under the unlimited
liability regime.16 They identify four critical differences between limited
and unlimited liability. First, limited liability reduces the need for share-
holders to monitor managers.1" With unlimited liability, monitoring costs
could be so high that equity investment would not get made in the first
place." Second, because a joint and several liability regime potentially
makes each shareholder liable for the entire amount of an unsatisfied
judgment, an unlimited liability regime forces shareholders to incur costs
of monitoring one another's wealth levels.19 Third, limited liability enables
the transfer of securities on a trading market, ensuring liquidity.' Absent
limited liability, shares would be difficult to value because they would carry
the potential of excess liabilities.2' The magnitude of such excess liabilities
would depend on the level of wealth of the shareholders; as a result, stock
pricing would encompass intractable variables, ' and free transfer would be
constrained.' Fourth, by reducing the monitoring costs and downside risks
of shareholding, limited liability facilitates diversification.' Because
diversification of holdings reduces the equityholders' risk, it lowers the
finn's cost of capital.' In addition, shareholder risk aversion is eliminated
from the agency relationship so that management is freer to make riskier
investments holding out greater returns. Thus, limited liability facilitates
a more productive investment policy for the firm.'
Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge that moral hazard results when
investors and managers are protected against potential liabilities for the
firm's investment losses and costs suffered by third-party tort claimants.27
15. The leading article is Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability
and the Corporation, 52 U. Cma. L. REV. 89 (1985).
16. Id. at 93.
17. Id. at 94.
18. Id. at 94-95.
19. Id. at 95-96.
20. Id. at 96.
21. Id.
22. See generally Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L. J. 117 (1980).
23. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 96.
24. Id. at 97.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 103-04.
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But they do not deem that problem to be determinative. 8 As to the firm's
voluntary claimants, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that no externality exists
because voluntary creditors receive compensation for the extra risk.29 As
to involuntary claimants, they argue that the expected magnitude of unsatis-
fied tort liability will be minimal. 30 The incentive to insure remains strong
despite limited liability because tort liability presents a threat to the
underdiversified, firm-specific human capital investments of the firm's
managers. 3' At the same time, voluntary insurance will not provide a
complete solution because it is doubtful that firms can insure fully against
all tort liability.32 Nonetheless, Easterbrook and Fischel conclude that the
benefits of limited liability outweigh the costs.
33
2. Pro Rata Theory
Pro rata theory, a contrasting approach to efficiency theory, has been
articulated by Leebron and Hansmann and Kraakman.Y Proponents of the
pro rata theory assert that most of the problems of unlimited liability
identified by efficiency theory are solved if the regime of unlimited liability
abandons the joint and several rule of partnership law in favor of a rule of
pro rata liability based on and limited by the proportion of equity owned by
each shareholder. Proponents assert that in a pro rata regime investors
would not have to monitor one anothers' levels of wealth and would have
every incentive to diversify to reduce the proportionate size of their hold-
ings.35 At the same time, the present system's perverse incentives to invest
in suboptimally risky production functions would be eliminated. 37 Propo-
nents also assert that in a pro rata regime unlimited liability will not ad-
versely affect the role of shareholding in the financial system and even will
serve to enhance firm performance. Although the cost of equity capital
would increase, more productive outcomes still can be expected because
28. Id.
29. Id. at 104-06.
30. Id. at 107-09.
31. Id. at 108-09.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Share-
holder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); David W. Leebron,
Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991).
35. See Leebron, supra note 34, at 1578-79.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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managers and investors would emerge with high-powered incentives to limit
the firms' pattern of risky activities or to increase the level of investment
in corporate insurance.38 A financial system benefit also is projected in that
business risk would be reflected in the share price. 9
The pro rata model has been criticized at the level of feasibility.
Critics assert that the model suffers from two significant limitations. First,
contingent liability (unlimited or otherwise) would have little impact on
share prices and liquidity. Given that offshore investors are attachment
proof and that modem financial instruments permit investors to arbitrage
the increased level of risk attached to the limited liability rule, little impact
on the share price of firms is projected.' ° The second limitation follows
from a legal process perspective. Because a given forum may be unable to
obtain jurisdiction over foreign shareholders, enforcement of an unlimited
liability system would carry significant administrative costs. As a result,
it would be rational for creditors to pursue only the wealthiest foreign
shareholders. Such a strategy would cause future investors to purchase
shares based on the wealth of the shareholder pool.4" Under this analysis,
the pro rata approach returns us to the scenario described under the effi-
ciency view.
3. Efficiency Theory, Pro Rata Theory, and the
Limited Liability Company
Ironically, LLC statutes proliferated just as pro rata theory appeared
to raise serious questions about the productivity effects of limited liability.
Given pro rata theory, an across-the-board inefficiency presumption respect-
ing limited liability became plausible for the first time. This presumption
has put proponents of LLC efficiency in an awkward position. Efficiency
theory no longer supplies an unshakable basis for asserting that limited
liability is a first-best result for public corporations. Indeed, even propo-
nents of large firm limited liability now argue from the position of feasibil-
ity; they claim that a limited liability regime is the first-best choice in a
38. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 1907.
39. More specifically, the emergence of a single share price eliminates certain
constraints on the movement of the share price. Hansmann and Kraakman explain that
unlimited liability, as applied to the publicly traded corporation, would cause the stock price
to "incorporate available information about the full extent of ... possible losses." Id.
40. Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 395-96 (1992).
41. Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural
Lens, 106 HARv. L. REv. 387, 429-31 (1992).
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second-best world of practice created by technical problems and perverse
incentives.42 In addition, the feasibility objections to a pro rata regime at
best rehabilitate limited liability only for publicly traded firms and provide
no basis for justifying limited liability for close corporations and LLCs.
LLC proponents have been forced to equivocate as a result of the
weaknesses in the efficiency theory. At least as to contract creditors, LLC
proponents continue to assert efficiency claims: firms with limited liability,
they argue, have to pay more for their credit, thus aligning the social costs
and benefits of their activities.43 LLC proponents have more trouble with
the irrelevance point - that is, that the shift of the risk of failure to the
firm's voluntary creditors is matched by an offsetting increase in the cost
of credit. They seek to refute this point by repeating the basics of effi-
ciency theory and by stretching them to fit the small-firm context. They
claim that the increased cost of credit is more than offset by (a) monitoring
cost savings resulting from delegation to specialized small-firm managers
and (b) diversification benefits resulting from venture capitalists assembling
portfolios of investments.' In addition, LLC proponents assert that all
parties save the cost of negotiating into limited liability, 45 and small-firm
creditors can diversify risk better than can small-firm equityholders." As
to involuntary creditors, LLC proponents have to concede that the econom-
ics give rise to a strong negative inference.47 They respond by pointing to
the offsetting benefits respecting relations with voluntary creditors," point-
ing to the possibility of veil-piercing,49 making old-fashioned appeals for the
need to encourage capital formation,'0 and asserting that the equity invest-
ments and risk aversion of small-firm investors will lead to considerable
internalization of tort risk."' At least one commentator boldly concludes
42. See id. at 444-45. See generally Grundfest, supra note 40. For a rebuttal to both,
see generally Mark R. Patterson, Is Unlimited Liability Really Unattainable?: Of Long Arms
and Short Sales, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 815 (1995).
43. Macey, supra note 14, at 449.
44. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 101-04; see also Macey, supra note 14, at 451.
45. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 105.
46. Macey, supra note 14, at 450-51. One might ask whether in that case they should
be expected to contract into limited liability anyway. For a strong argument that this would
not be the case, see Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of
Resources, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 140, 157-58 (1994).
47. Macey, supra note 14, at 448-50.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Ribstein, supra note 14, at 129.
50. Macey, supra note 14, at 451.
51. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 127-28.
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that the benefits outweigh the costs.52 However, LLC proponents fail to
confront directly the pro rata theory.
B. The Efficiency Theory of Limited Liability in a
Larger Theoretical Context
This subpart situates the efficiency theory of limited liability within the
larger framework of theories of agency and optimal capital and ownership
structure. This larger context shows that efficiency theory is derived from
assertions prominent in the theory of the firnm as postured ten or fifteen
years ago. Efficiency theory remains rooted in these assertions today.
Meanwhile, the theory of the firm, like a caravan, has moved on.
We focus on the implications of two assertions central to the efficiency
case for the LLC: (a) that limited liability promotes efficiency by enabling
diversified shareholding and liquidity, and (b) that diversified shareholding
leads to an efficient firm investment policy. We inquire whether these
efficiency assertions are safe as a matter of economic theory. Our analysis
focuses on the assertions' close ties to first-generation agency theories of
the firm and questions those theories' success at evading the irrelevance
point. Further, we describe a contrasting line of theory on management-
investor incentive contracting. Our response next surveys some economic
literature on financial contracting and optimal ownership structure that
attempts to eliminate agency costs under a limited liability regime. Finally,
we consider a recent financial economic suggestion that there may not be
a single ownership structure that deals optimally with the complex agency
problems of ownership structure and financial contracting. An important
contextual limitation should be noted: involuntary creditors do not appear
in the economic theory of capital and ownership structure, and so we refer
here only to models of relationships among managers, contract creditors,
and equityholders.
1. The Irrelevance Hypothesis and First-Generation Agency Theory
Economic theories of capital and ownership structure have evolved as
a response to the irrelevance hypothesis of Modigliani and Miller.53 Under
the Modigliani-Miller model, firm value in a full information and taxless
world stems entirely from the production function and is independent of
52. Id. Another commentator is more cautious, leaving the bottom-line question open.
Macey, supra note 14, at 449-50.
53. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261 (1958).
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capital structure.' Furthermore, the cost of capital is constant across all
debt-equity ratios." Applying the irrelevance hypothesis of capital structure
to business form - the choice of corporate or partnership structure makes
no difference to the value of the firm, at least so far as concerns the effects
of contracts with voluntary creditors. As noted above, the irrelevance point
continues to show up in legal discussions of limited liability when it is
noted that the interest rate fully reflects risk shifted to creditors.56
Agency theory rebuts the irrelevance hypothesis by showing that fric-
tions that impact the value of the firm's production function emerge from
features of standard debt and equity contracts. As a result, agency theory
holds that an optimal capital and ownership structure for the firm exists as
a theoretical proposition. The efficiency theory of limited liability uses this
agency perspective;' when it asserts that the single limited liability owner-
ship structure reflects the optimal arrangement for productive investment.
Recall Jensen and Meckling's classic model of frictions attending stan-
dard debt and equity contracts . Here, limited liability makes its first ap-
pearance in a model of optimal capital and ownership structure. The model
asserts that agency costs attach both to equity and to debt.59 As to debt, the
conflicting interests of debtholders and equityholders give equityholders an
incentive to invest suboptimally. Given the debt contract's provision for a
fixed payment, equityholders receive a fairly large portion of the positive
returns on investment. Yet, given limited liability, debtholders can experi-
ence a greater loss on the downside if the investment fails. Thus, the
limited liability regime is not irrelevant. Indeed, the limited liability regime
is suboptimal because its differential effect on downside risk gives equity-
holders an incentive to invest in highly (and suboptimally) risky projects.
As to equity, costly conflicts arise between managers and outside equity-
holders because the managers are not the residual owners of the firm.
Managers do not gain pro rata from the firm's profit-making activities,
cannot diversify their risky human capital investments, and remain exposed
54. Id. at 268.
55. Id. at 268, 281-88.
56. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 105.
57. The fundamental articles are Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory
of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency
Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); and Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
58. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 57.
59. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 57, at 333-49.
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to the firm's downside risk. Accordingly, they will tend to pursue their
own interests at the expense of wealth-maximizing activities for the firm.
Jensen and Meckling looked to contractually grounded monitoring and
incentive schemes to offset the agency costs of capital and ownership struc-
ture.' By hypothesis, the optimal capital and ownership structure is the
one that minimizes agency costs. Debtholders, for example, will anticipate
the asset substitution problem described above and will attempt to minimize
its effect (and the effects of other agency costs of debt) with covenants and
by increasing the cost of the debt. Furthermore, certain firms could com-
mit themselves to operate in the interests of their equityholders and restrict
managerial shirking by increasing the amount of debt.61 According to the
Jensen and Meckling model and related models, then, the central concern
is to show how the capital structure can be employed as an incentive
instrument.6' The efficiency theory of limited liability follows this pattern
precisely when it asserts that limited liability is needed to facilitate share-
holder diversification because diversification permits managers to achieve
the productivity benefits of a risk-neutral investment policy.
A series of objections have been raised against this agency view of the
firm. Strictly speaking, when agency theory holds that capital structure
manipulation is the dominant strategy for influencing management produc-
tivity, it assumes that the terms of the managers' contract with the equity-
holders are fixed. Agency theory thereby fails to consider the alternative
option of offering managers incentives not to interfere with the firm's
choice of financing.63 If we can materially influence managers' incentives
60. Id.
61. The attempt to resolve the conflict between managers and shareholders by taking
on more debt can of course result in new conflicts between debtholders and equityholders,
as many learned to their regret during the 1980s and early 1990s.
In a related model, developed in Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediaries and
Delegated Monitoring, 51 REv. ECON. STUD. 393 (1984), the agency problem between
manager and outside investor is analyzed in terms of introducing an optimal penalty that
operates to maximize the manager's expected payoff. Viewing the basic framework in terms
of whether verification costs can be minimized, Diamond's model implies that when a man-
ager can appropriate any income not paid out, a nonpecuniary penalty can be imposed on
the agent on the basis of what is paid out. The optimal penalty is a standard debt contract
that permits the investor to appropriate all the reserve. The problem with Diamond's model
is that it is not consistent with ownership of equity claims made by outside investors. That
is, these debt-like contracts, which assume risk-neutrality, one-period contracting, and a
single investor and deterministic verification, are too simplistic and, as a result, fail to apply
to contract situations between investors and managers.
62. Diamond, supra note 61.
63. See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 63, 81 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
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by varying the terms of their contracts, it is reasonable to assume that the
same incentives can be offered under different capital structures. In theory,
unless agency theory can explain why changes in capital structure cannot
be undone by corresponding changes in the contractual incentive scheme,
agency analysis re-emerges as consistent with the Modigliani and Miller
hypothesis, and we lapse back to irrelevance.' The same result would
follow for limited liability.
2. Limited Liability for Managers and Models of Investor-Manager
Incentive Contracts
The previous section having asserted that contracting between manag-
ers and equity investors serves as a means of reasserting the theoretical
irrelevance of capital and ownership structure, this section follows up by
examining some models of manager-equityholder incentive contracts.
Unsurprisingly, managers' preference as to limited or unlimited liability for
business failure is a central variable in these models. Also unsurprisingly,
the question whether capital structure is a critical component in an optimal
incentive structure remains sharply contested. As these models show us,
today that contest proceeds in an assumptional context quite different from
the context prevailing in the first-generation agency models that inform the
efficiency theory of limited liability.
The earliest manager-investor models followed an agency framework.
These models asserted that risk-sharing between managers and investors
could lead to an optimal outcome, given asymmetric information at the time
of contracting and risk neutrality on the part of the manager. In addition,
these simple models assumed that the firm's output, although influenced by
the manager's activities, is nevertheless observable. For the most part,
these models' moral hazard approaches were based on the premise that the
manager, before contracting, could select a distribution over the output of
the firm which is influenced by his effort.65 These models asserted that it
was optimal for the manager to rent the technology from the investor.
Using the same assumptions, Harris and Raviv moved this literature
forward a step to show that a self-interested principal can design an optimal
contract with a firm's manager.' This model asserts that in the absence of
limited liability or other risk constraints, the optimal contract mitigates the
1989).
64. Modigliani & Miller, supra note 53.
65. See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 63, at 80.
66. Milton Harris & Arthur Raviv, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect
Information, 20 J. ECON. THEoRY 231 (1979).
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agency problem by placing all the risk and upside returns for the project on
the manager. The investor receives a fixed amount under the contract in
exchange for his investment, and the manager receives all the additional
returns from the project. These provisions mitigate the agency problem.
But this mitigation of the agency problem is achieved only because the
model assumes the existence of contractual institutions, such as the posting
of a bond to guarantee that the agent will not breach the contract regardless
of how costly maintaining that course of action becomes for the agent. In
effect, the manager's position in the model of Harris and Raviv corresponds
to that of a holder of unlimited liability equity, with the position of the
investor corresponding to that of a holder of riskless debt. However, the
fixed payment to the investor limits the model's feasibility67 because we are
not really modeling equity investment.
Subsequent models are more robust. For one thing, they achieve
limited liability for the manager. In a model developed by Innes,68 the
manager's costly efforts (which the investor cannot observe) improve the
expected returns of the investor, and the investor's compensation cannot be
decreased regardless of firm profit.69 Under the model, if the investor's
compensation is monotonic-increasing, the investor's first-best choice will
be a debt contract. Without the monotonic constraint, the optimal contract
will give the manager all the profits in times of high profit and none of the
profits when the firm's profits are below a given level. This more realistic
model still suffers from the monotonicity requirement. This constraint,
Innes notes, "can be motivated either by a requirement that investors never
have an incentive to sabotage the firm or by an ability of entrepreneurs to
costlessly revise their profit reports upward (with hidden borrowing for
example)."7I Neither of these situations is likely enough to provide support
for Innes's debt-contracting result.
Recent models move closer to replicating the observed relationships of
managers and investors with ownership claims. Williams offers a multi-
period model of the firm that involves a risk-averse manager and investors
who are in effect risk-neutral.71 Williams assumes that the manager's effort
67. See Robert Innes, Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Ex Ante Action
Choices, 52 J. EcON. THEoRY 45 (1990).
68. Id.
69. This is consistent with the view that all financial contracts, such as the optimal
debt contract, are nondecreasing.
70. Id. at 46.
71. Cy. Joseph T. Williams, Perquisites, Risk and Capital Structure, 42 J. FIN. 29-48
(1987) (stating that optimal corporate agency structure requires mix of debt and equity and
certain perks).
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influences firm output, and that this output is unobservable by outside
investors. The investors commit at t = 0 in reliance on an ex ante monitor-
ing system that functions to restrict the manager from appropriating the
firm's returns - specifically, the provision of debt collateral. The model
provides that the value of the collateral is uncertain at t = 1 and observed
only by the manager. The Williams model stipulates that financial contracts
must specify what fraction of the collateral and what amount of cash earn-
ings should be transferred to outside investors at t = 1. The problem is
that amounts to be transferred must depend on the manager's report which
depends on the unobserved value of the debt collateral. Although some
have taken the position that the optimal contract would have the manager
allocating the entire collateral to investors, Williams argues that such an
allocation would result in the manager suffering a costly control loss.
Thus, for Williams, the optimal contract must be incentive compatible -
outside investors receive the entire asset and no cash when the value of the
asset and control value are low; and, when the values are high, outside
investors receive a fraction of that value. The results of this model demon-
strate that the optimal contracts involve features of both equity and debt.
The result of the Williams model contrasts starkly with the results of
the earlier agency cost exercises respecting manager-investor relations.
Because earlier models assumed that the manager could affect the distribu-
tion of returns, they had to rely heavily on techniques such as monitoring
verification devices and deadweight penalties in order to get optimal results.
Under the Williams model, a contractual priority does the job. The Wil-
liams model, with its emphasis on the problem of verifying firm results
over time, highlights the excess simplicity of the agency model of Jensen
and Meckling, which focused on a financial contract over only a single per-
iod.' In order to reach the conclusion that changes in the capital structure
can be used as an incentive device to align the interests of managers, the
Jensen and Meckling model and other first-generation agency models had
to assume that firm profitability and cash flows are fully contractible. The
Williams model, like other recent work in financial economics, alters these
basic assumptions. 3 This model is more in line with the experience of
actual firms because contracting for optimal investment incentives must
cover contingencies that unfold over time. In addition, these recent models
look past the debt-equity ratio to changes in the institutional features of the
firm for effective means of limiting managers' ability to appropriate the
firm's returns.
72. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 57; see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text
(discussing Jensen & Meckling model).
73. Williams, supra note 71.
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The contractual priority in the Williams model gets part of its incentive
power from its debt-like characteristic and part from its equity-like charac-
teristic. Therein lies its contestability. A contrasting line of multiperiod
asymmetric information models asks sharp questions about the relative
effectiveness of management-investor contracts and control transfer struc-
tures bound up in capital structure as a means to channel management
incentives in productive directions. The economists responsible for these
models assert that to the extent that crucial management choices are non-
contractible due to problems of observability and verifiability, monetary-
incentive schemes based on firm profitability or stock market performance
cannot be expected to import adequate discipline. Although a second-best
solution, control structures that allow outsiders to take actions that manag-
ers dislike in the event of poor firm performance can do a more effective
job of manipulating management incentives in productive directions.74
Hart offers a more formal expression of this point.75 He notes that,
given managers who derive no private benefits from control of assets, first-
best results easily can be achieved (in a taxless world) with an all-equity
capital structure and a simple incentive compensation system. In a two-
period situation, Hart simply would make the managers' compensation
depend entirely on the dividend on the stock. That is, assuming investment
at t = 0, and cash flows to be realized at t = 1 and t = 2, incentive
compensation I should equal B(dt=l + dt=2), where B is a small positive
number, and d is a dividend. If the payment also covers liquidation pro-
ceeds L at t = 2, then I = B[dt=l + (dt=2, L)], and the manager can be
expected to make an optimal decision respecting liquidation at t = 1. If at
t =1, the expected L is greater than the cash flow expected at t = 2, the
firm is liquidated at t = 1, and no indebtedness is needed in order to align
management incentives.76
74. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of
Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence, 109 Q. J. ECON. 1027, 1028 (1994).
Similar observations have been made respecting the agency dynamics of investment
within a firm. Arijit Mukherji & Nandu J. Nagarajan, Moral Hazard and Contractibility
in Investment Decisions, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 413 (1995). Mukherji and Nagarajan
model the situation of a principal investing in research and development projects. They
show that if the principal receives verifiable "hard" signals concerning the quality of the
projects during the development period, the principal will be able to make a full ex ante
commitment to a project. But, problems of opportunism and monitoring costs still will
make for a second-best result - the principal rationally will overinvest relative to the
first-best. In contrast, in a world holding out only "soft" noncontractible information prior
to the last period, underinvestment is predicted.
75. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995).
76. Id. Note an interesting real-world implication of these observations - incentive
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But managers do derive private benefits from asset management, and
in Hart's conception, the bribe B required to align management incentives
with those of the outside security holders is unfeasibly large. Accordingly,
a complex capital structure that includes control mandates must be interpo-
lated. In a dynamic environment, a range of possibly optimal contractual
formulas for setting the terms of that control transfer can be suggested;
however, uncertainty makes it impossible to deem any one formula
optimal.' Thus, under Hart's model, it appears that a simple one-period
incentive contract that sets the firm's capital structure based upon a particu-
lar projection of the appropriate direction for the agents' activities will not
be optimal for all future scenarios. As a result, a significant question arises
for the efficiency theory of limited liability. The question is whether it
follows that, in a dynamic and uncertain environment, more than one
liability structure for the firm's owners might be optimal, rather than the
single structure assumed in first-generation agency theory.
3. Optimal Ownership Structures, Agency Theory, and Limited Liability
The efficiency theory of limited liability relies heavily on a second line
of first-generation agency theory when it suggests that a single ownership
structure maximizes the value of the firm. More particularly, efficiency
theory's operative notions are (a) that diversified and dispersed shareholding
leads to efficient investment policies; (b) that limited liability, by promoting
diversification, provides high-powered incentives for firm managers to
invest the firms' resources in assets whose value is higher than under the
next available alternative; and (c) that limited liability creates value by
assuring easy transferability of shares, presumably due to an assumption
that optimal incentives obtain inside the firm when its equity interests trade
in an outside market with maximum liquidity.
The line of agency theory that supports these operative notions looks
to the structure of ownership to ameliorate moral hazard problems on the
part of those performing the production function. The connection between
ownership structure and production can be traced back to the classic analy-
sis of Alchian and Demsetz. 78 Their model considers the incentive prob-
lems of team production and asks how asset owners can induce the manager
compensation should come in the form of illiquid long positions in stock rather than in the
form of stock options.
77. See William W. Bratton, Dividends, Noncontractibility, and Corporate Law, 19
CARDozo L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
78. Armin A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
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of the asset to cooperate. The model introduces two mechanisms to over-
come the control problem - monetary incentives and a third-party moni-
tor - and assumes that the monitor can measure the agents' performance.
Fama and Jensen later sharpened this theory by centering on how the
structure of ownership can be altered to limit the externalities tied up with
the incentive problems of joint production.19 More specifically, they argued
that an ownership structure, such as a partnership, can be designed to
produce an optimal outcome for the firm. The equilibrium result allegedly
follows from the role played by contractual constraints enforced by third
parties.
The inquiry into the relationship between ownership structure, team
production, and firm value moved toward robustness when Holmstrom
identified concentration of equity ownership as a critical bottom-line
factor.' Holmstrom's model considers techniques for disciplining produc-
tion team members. Holmstrom emphasizes that there is no sharing rule
which can achieve an equilibrium outcome. Given technological non-
separabilities and problems in monitoring individual contributions to firm
output, team members always will have an incentive to collude to facilitate
shirking and therefore cannot enforce a sharing agreement among them-
selves. Therefore, a principal always must exist to enforce penalties
respecting shirking. To solve the moral hazard problem respecting agents,
the principal must impose an incentive scheme that breaks the firm's budget
constraint. In other words, given bad news about team performance, a
budgeting authority must be in a position to cut off needed capital.8"
Holmstrom suggests that shareholders with an ongoing contingent commit-
ment to provide capital could perform this incentive function; upon occur-
rence of the contingency related to team performance, the shareholders are
released from their funding commitment. Furthermore, the incentives are
provided by a marginal source - investors. In the face of contingencies,
investors must cooperate to finance the marginal distribution of profits. As
a result, to the extent that investors are called on to make contributions to
a fund, it is unlikely that free-rider problems will arise.
A final problem remains for solution in the Holmstrom model.
Holmstrom asserts that to the extent equity ownership requires monitoring,
there will be an incentive for some owners to free ride on other owners'
efforts. From a monitoring perspective, then, a single owner might be
79. Fama & Jensen, supra note 57.
80. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. EcON. 324 (1982).
81. At the margin, says Holmstrom, this is more likely to produce an equilibrium
outcome. Id. at 326-28.
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optimal. Thus, the costs of independently monitoring the firm and pledging
capital for financing raise a question respecting the optimal level of owner-
ship concentration.'
The problem that Holmstrom identifies - the relationship between
ownership concentration, liquidity, management agency costs, and investor
incentives respecting governance - is well known to corporate lawyers as
the separation of ownership and control. Holmstrom's suggestion that
concentration might help solve the separation problem was novel because
when he wrote in the early 1980s, takeovers and other market controls were
thought to be adequate to overcome shareholder collective action problems.
Holmstrom's line of agency theory, then, anticipated the turn taken by the
1990s corporate law discussion of governance initiatives for institutional
shareholders.' Holmstrom's concentration theory also has disturbing
implications for efficiency theory because efficiency theory asserts without
equivocation that limited liability enhances productivity by discouraging
concentration and encouraging diversification.A4
This theoretical inquiry into optimal ownership structure remains at an
early stage of development. As it evolves, it centers on the problems
facing increased levels of firm ownership in the presence of private infor-
mation. If shares are highly diversified, there are few incentives for a
single investor to invest in monitoring and control. Block holding of shares
could solve the problem of the shareholder disincentives to invest in moni-
toring and control that come with high diversification. But block holding
is discouraged by the fact that the block holder incurs the significant cost
of forgoing her chance fully to diversify her portfolio. Shleifer and Vishny
confronted this problem with a model of an equity-financed firm in which
there is one large shareholder and a number of small shareholders who free
ride. 5  In this model, firm value increases with a larger shareholder's
presence. Consequently, the large shareholders are likely to have an
incentive to retain their large shareholdings. The problem arises if the
large shareholders are able to sell their shares anonymously in the trading
market because they will have every incentive to do so.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OwNERS: THE POLITICAL
RooTs OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 233-39, 260-81 (1994).
84. We note that pro rata theory asserts that pro rata unlimited liability encourages
diversification. However, this assertion is distinct from efficiency theory. With pro rata
theory, diversification causes enhanced monitoring incentives. Efficiency theory, in
contrast, claims that decreased monitoring incentives are efficient.
85. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,
94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986).
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A recent model from Bolton and von Thadden takes a second look at
this problem.' They examine the properties of a choice between concen-
trated, illiquid shareholdings and a combination of a control block and a
publicly traded, noncontrolling portion of the firm's stock. The question
is whether a closely held firm can go public with a big block still in place
under an arrangement in which the small holders compensate the remaining
block holder for the cost of foregone diversification. In theory, such a deal
holds advantages for the small holders because the monitoring services of
the control block likely will lead to greater returns than would be received
with fully dispersed shares. But this arrangement encounters the problem
identified by Shleifer and Vishny in the precedent model:' because the
trading market will be anonymous, the large shareholder will have an
incentive to take in compensation through one door and unwind his position
through slow market sales out the other door. The result is that there will
be few incentives on the part of the small holders to commit to paying for
the monitoring ex ante. Consequently, block holding will be less attractive.
In addition, if public trading aggravates information asymmetries between
the block holder and the small holders, there will be an additional negative
impact on the feasibility of a financial arrangement between the block
holder and the rest of the shareholder group. The small holders will be
willing to enter into the arrangement only in a very special case: they must
have reliable information about the future plans of the block holder.
Unsurprisingly, Bolton and von Thadden conclude that there is no optimal
tradeoff between liquidity and concentration."8
This line of inquiry prompts questions about efficiency theory's associ-
ation of diversification and productivity. Significantly, it also has prompted
a model that reconsiders the place of limited liability in the theory of the
firm. 9 This model, presented by Andrew Winton, suggests that contingent
shareholder liability is feasible and holds potential productivity benefits and
that shareholder assumption of additional liability is interconnected with the
efficient choice of an ownership structure. Winton notes that his model is
motivated by the successful appearance in practice of unlimited liability
with respect to large firms. He cites a range of examples including Lloyds
86. Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate
Control (unpublished paper presented at The Design of Financial Systems and Markets: A
Symposium on Financial Intermediation and Corporate Finance, Loosdrecht, Holland, June
6-8, 1996) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 85.
88. Bolton & von Thadden, supra note 86, at 22-23.
89. Andrew Winton, Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm,
48 J. FIN. 487 (1993).
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of London, unlimited liability for shareholders in Britain, and double
liability for chartered banks in the United StatesY0
In the model, Winton stipulates that there are a number of large
(symmetric) shareholders who each may be responsible for additional
financing for the firm. The model assumes that any investor can monitor
the activities of management and that investors always will prefer to in-
crease the amount of wealth they invest in the firm. The model demon-
strates that the wealth effects of increasing shareholder concentration
depend on the cost function of monitoring. If the cost of monitoring is
positive, an increase in the number of shareholders causes the value of the
firm to decrease. The model shows that, given the adverse selection
problem that arises when there is additional liquidity, investors have an
incentive to commit their external wealth to bond management. The model
assumes that most of investors' external wealth is illiquid. Thus, the model
asserts that investors will prefer to commit their assets through a contingent
guarantee - collateralized debt - rather than to make an actual investment
in the firm. This is asserted to reduce the probability of liquidation costs.
The model's insight is that as long as the firm is funded by a large number
of shareholders via collateralized debt, wealth illiquidity will impose a
transaction cost that mitigates the adverse selection problem on both sides
of the market. Thus, the average price of a share will reflect the residual
wealth of the poorest outside shareholder. The model challenges the
position that unlimited liability causes share value to decrease because it
causes shares to gravitate to poorer investors who have less to lose.
Winton makes one additional assumption in his model. Specifically,
Winton cannot get a result favoring a contingent liability regime without
trading restrictions on the equity and wealth verifications respecting the
shareholders. 91 His model of contingent liability thus concludes that,
although increasing shareholder liability has benefits as well as costs, there
is a difficult cost-benefit tradeoff choice between adverse selection and
costly restraints on trading. Unsurprisingly, the tradeoff between liquidity
and monitoring requires empirical investigation.
We note an absence of conclusive empirical work on the connection
between ownership structure and firm performance.' The pertinent studies
90. Id. at 487-90. For a fuller presentation of the history, see PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG,
THE LAw OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS
IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1987).
91. Winton notes that limiting the sale of shares without approval or requiring residual
liability has been employed in many unlimited liability settings. Winton, supra note 89, at
500.
92. To our knowledge, no conclusive empirical work exists on this point.
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send conflicting signals. An early study by Demsetz and Lehn9 found no
significant relationship between ownership concentration and accounting
profit rate.' But, in a different context, Wruck observed that private
placements of equity produce higher shareholder concentration and positive
stock prices and concluded that the public, perceiving that higher
shareholding concentration involves better monitoring, places a higher value
on the firm. 5 A contrasting study by Leach and Leahy revealed that in
firms in which nondiversifiable risk is high, there is likely to be more
managerial shirking.1 In this regard, shareholders reap more benefits from
monitoring. However, the Leach and Leahy study found no evidence that
higher shareholder concentration produces a higher return on investment.
C. Some Questions About Insurance
Corporate law teachers like to rely on insurance as the solution to the
problem of limited liability. The efficiency and pro rata theories also rely
on insurance at critical junctures, but with radically different treatments.
Serious questions can be asked about both theories' use of insurance.
1. Efficiency Theory
Easterbrook and Fischel suggest that limited liability does not give rise
to significant externalities because corporations will contract for insurance
on activities that implicate significant social costs. 97 Given limited liability,
corporations have an incentive to invest in risky activities even when they
cannot pass along the extra costs to consumers. One result is that the firm,
in order to capture the market rents it requires, will transfer some of the
costs to involuntary creditors. Given that shareholders have limited liability
and incentives to diversify, how could it be cost-effective for the finm to
contract for insurance? Intuitively, when the firm contracts for risk cover-
age of its socially costly business activities, it pays extra for protection that
its shareholders already have. Accordingly, the incentive to insure must
93. Harold Demnsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes
and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985), reprinted in 1 HAROLD DEMSETZ,
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND THE FIRM, THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC AcTIvITY 202-22
(1988).
94. Thereby supporting Demsetz's earlier insights. Id. at 217-19.
95. Karen Hopper Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence
from Private Equity Financings, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (1989).
96. Dennis Leach & John Leahy, Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications
and the Performance of Large British Companies, 101 ECON. J. 1418 (1991).
97. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15.
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stem from limited possibilities to diversify the negative spillovers of busi-
ness risk on the part of managers, employees, and certain investors. An
additional cost incentive stems from risk sensitivity on the part of voluntary
creditors who adjust contract terms to reflect risk - lower interest rates on
debt offset insurance costs to some extent. Once a limited liability entity
purchases tort liability insurance, say Easterbrook and Fischel, it will have
less incentive to transfer risk and a diminished incentive to invest in risky
activities.9" In addition, to the extent that the firm insures, there will be
less probability of organizational collapse via bankruptcy.' Easterbrook
and Fischel caution that they do not claim that the insurance incentive they
describe completely eliminates the incentive to engage in risky activities that
accompanies limited liability.1 Ribstein extends this analysis to the LLC,
arguing that LLC members will have sufficient incentives to insure for their
potential tort liability."10
Hansmann and Kraakman object to the Easterbrook and Fischel analy-
sis." 2 In their view, firms with limited liability have an incentive to
underprovide for insurance."° Why should managers invest in insurance,
they ask, when it may indicate to outside investors that they are shirking?1"
Managers may want to show investors that they are undertaking sufficiently
risky investments without drawing attention to their contrary career con-
cerns." In addition, liability insurance contracts have ceilings on cover-
age," leading to decisions to insure at a low coverage limit. Firms also
may mistake either the frequency of claims or the number of claimants that
will settle rather than pursue the full claim."° The fact that firms fre-
quently pursue an underinsurance strategy suggests that shareholders will
have low-powered incentives to protect potential tort victims."'8 Hansmann
and Kraakman suggest that even if a firm wanted to purchase full insurance
98. Id. at 107-11.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 129.
102. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 1887.
103. Id. at 1887-89.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1889. See generally Gur Huberman et al., Optimal Insurance Policy
Indemnity Schedules, 14 BELL J. ECON. 415 (1983).
107. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 1887-89.
108. Id.
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coverage, the existence of moral hazard and loading costs destroys any
incentive to follow through. 1"
Hillman, in turn, has countered Ribstein's extension of the Easterbrook
and Fischel analysis to the LLC. He observes that Ribstein fails to take
into account the differences between insurance incentives respecting public
corporation ownership structures and small-firm ownership structures."'
Hillman notes that the insurance incentive will not exist when the firm's
assets are worth less than its potential liabilities. Alternatively, Hillman
suggests that risk-averse employees and managers of underinsured or
undercapitalized firms could instead bargain ex ante for additional compen-
sation as an insurance substitute. We find these criticisms persuasive.
2. Pro Rata Theory
Insurance also plays an important role in the case for pro rata unlim-
ited liability. Insurance provides essential support for the theory's predic-
tions of a high-powered shareholder monitoring incentive with respect to
suboptimal risky investment and of only modest increases in the cost of
liability to investors. The two predictions can be made simultaneously only
to the extent that liability insurance actually would be available to firms
under an unlimited liability regime. If insurance is unavailable, unlimited
liability will mean increased costs for investors. Given complete insurance,
those costs could be contained with shareholders having a high-powered
incentive to reduce risk taking due to a desire to keep down the insurance's
cost. Hansmann and Kraakman admit, however, that insurance markets
essentially are incomplete, with market performance being hobbled by
moral hazard, asymmetric information, and loading costs.' The viability
of their theory accordingly depends on the robustness of their assertion that
the insurance market nevertheless substantially performs its job. Hansmann
and Kraakman argue that loading costs, although substantial, are unlikely
to be significantly greater than the costs of defending tort actions or the
transaction costs related to bankruptcy. They also assert that insurance
firms generally are able to control moral hazard through ratings and moni-
toring of potential insureds. They then assume that there would be no
higher level of risk bearing by investors under unlimited liability.
109. Id.
110. Robert W. Hillman, Limited Liability and Externalization of Risk: A Comment on
the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 477, 480-501 (1992).
111. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 1887-89. Hansmann and Kraakman
neglect to point out that in some cases insurance may not be available. See JOSEPH E.
STIGLMrZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 287-88 (1994) (citing to working paper).
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We wonder whether pro rata theory asks for more than the insurance
market can bear. The assertion that the insurance market works well
enough is based on the assumption that insurers, through experience,
ratings, and menus, are able to design contracts that effectively reduce
adverse selection and moral hazard. Early work in the economics of
insurance supports this conclusion by showing the existence of an equilib-
rium in which high-risk and low-risk types separate themselves by selecting
different price-quantity policies."' More recent work still shows that in
contracts in which a menu is available to policyholders to select the amount
of coverage based on price per unit, policyholders sort themselves based on
their type."3  But there is some evidence to the contrary. It has been
suggested that experience-rated contracts lead to first-best outcomes only
under limited conditions." Indeed, these contracts are feasible only when
an insurer has a comparative advantage over rivals in monitoring the claims
histories of policyholders." 5 Therefore, if an information asymmetry
regarding valuable claim information exists, the underwriting policies with
respect to new policies could lead to a lowballing price policy. The evi-
dence of lowballing is consistent with the presence of adverse selection in
certain insurance markets, such as the market for automobile policies.
We also have questions about the assertion that the insurance market
can handle the increased levels of risk and demand that would follow a shift
to an unlimited liability regime. The insurance industry, like other indus-
tries, may be subject to underinvestment problems that lead to the reduction
of the value of its firms' equity and policies. The degree and location of
the problem will depend on the situation. The ability of insurers to insulate
themselves from exogenous shocks (due to interest rates and so forth) may
be related to their ownership structure, capital market access, and reinsur-
ance availability and varies across the insurance industry." 6
112. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976).
113. In practice, the insurance industry tends to rely on multiperiod, experience-related
contracts to select out high- and low-risk types.
114. Stephen P. D'Arcy & Neil A. Doherty, Adverse Selection, Private Information,
and Lowballing in Insurance Markets, 63 J. Bus. 145, 148 (1990) (referring to Samuel Gal
& Michael Landsberger, On "Small Sample" Properties of Experience Rating Insurance
Contracts, 103 Q.J. ECON. 233 (1988)).
115. Id. at 150 (referring to Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Market Equilibrium
with Private Knowledge: An Insurance Example, 26 J. PuB. ECON. 269 (1985)).
116. See Neil A. Doherty & James R. Garven, Insurance Cycles: Interest Rates and the
Capacity Constraint Model, 68 J. BUS. 383 (1995).
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The literature on insurance, considering the industry capacity question
from another angle, asserts that firms operating in insurance markets have
a basic shortcoming - there is a limit on the amount of insurance that any
firm can offer. 1 7 Moreover, capacity in insurance markets fluctuates. 118
Under this constrained capacity view, unanticipated claims on insurance
firms lead to a loss in equity that can be replaced either internally or
externally. 19 Given sudden and excessive losses, the insurance firms'
short-term supply curve will shift.' To the extent that insurance firms
prefer internal capital, they will have to respond by increasing premiums. 1
2
As a result, capacity will be constrained. This constrained capacity model
is thought fairly to explain the reasons for cyclical changes in premiums for
insurance contracts.' " Given the existence of an underwriting cycle, some
have suggested that an imbalance between supply and demand exists in the
industry.121 Insurance company earnings lately have been substantially
impacted by losses, and the capital bases of insurance companies are under
review."24 As a response to this capacity constraint, the Chicago Board of
Trade in 1995 introduced a new catastrophe option to hedge against risk of
loss due to unexpected events."z Although the introduction of an option
contract provides an important new asset to control risk, it should be noted
that this instrument offers only a small reduction in an insurer's exposure
to credit risk."
This suggests that more empirical support may be needed to sustain
Hansmann and Kraakman's assertion that contracting institutions within the
insurance industry work reasonably well." The question remains open
117. Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Insurance Markets, 5 J. ECON. PERsP. 115, 126-29
(1991).
118. Id. at 126-31.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Much of the industry losses suffered during the 1980s could be linked to adverse
selection and other characteristics of the insurance market. In contrast, during the 1990s,
the insurance and reinsurance industries face a new capacity constraint that is linked to more
frequent and more costly natural disasters taking place.
123. Michael S. Canter et al., Insurance Derivatives: A New Asset Class for the Capital
Markets and a New Hedging Tool for the Insurance Industry, 4 J. DERivATIVmS 89 (1996).
124. Id. at 89-91.
125. The contracts were introduced based on information that insurance losses poten-
tially could limit the overall effectiveness of the industry. Id. at 92.
126. Id. at 95.
127. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 1887-89.
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whether the insurance market is sufficiently stable and predictable to
provide liability insurance under an unlimited liability regime. We note
that the complexity of this industry's problems may make the requisite
support difficult to marshal. The possibility of controlling moral hazard
and other market imperfections is difficult to measure unless the individual
performance of each firn in the industry is evaluated. What, for example,
are the incentives to monitor and supervise managers in an industry that
may suffer financial losses for idiosyncratic reasons rather than because of
moral hazard?
IL Regulatory Competition and the Limited Liability Company:
Law as Domestic Product
Proponents of the LLC employ a regulatory competition story to
counter negative implications arising from the back-and-forth debate on
limited liability. This line of defense draws heavily from the literature that
describes and justifies state competition for public corporation charters.
That precedent regulatory competition story is retold in the first subpart
below. The subparts that follow confront and refute the story's extension
to the LLC. This three-part analysis first considers the prospects for
adoption of an LLC statute in a hypothetical island jurisdiction assumed to
have an income tax system and interest group alignment identical to those
of a typical American state. This discussion invokes public choice theory
to project that special interests in the jurisdiction will procure an LLC
statute. This analysis is then extended to a hypothetical federal system of
four states in which charter competition is precluded by a sige r~el choice
of law rule. Here the question is whether the enactment of an LLC statute
by a single state in the federation can lead to a race to the bottom. The
discussion shows that possibilities for externalizing the costs of torts make
a race to the bottom a structural possibility. But the discussion also pro-
jects that this race to the bottom scenario is highly unlikely to occur in
practice. The final subpart carries the analysis to a hypothetical federal
system in which charter competition is a structural possibility. Here the
question is whether the enactment of LLC statutes can be characterized as
a competitive race to the top. The discussion acknowledges the possible
presence of competitive influences, but concludes that these influences do
not provide a plausible basis for explaining either the initial proliferation or
the ongoing evolution of LLC statutes. Domestic rent seeking by interest
groups, the explanation offered for the first subpart's island jurisdiction,
provides a better explanation even in the context of a federal system.
Interstate competition emerges in a secondary posture, taking its usual role
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as an inevitable limiting factor on state-level economic regulation. Thus
positioned, it cannot support an efficiency presumption and, accordingly,
has no significant justificatory role to play for the LLC.
A. Corporate Charter Competition
Regulatory competition is an economic theory of governmental organi-
zation that equates decentralization with first-best equilibrium results. The
theory analogizes law to product and then asserts that junior level govern-
ments - local, state, or national, as opposed to federal or supernational -
compete for citizens and factors of production when they regulate.'2 The
theory predicts that such competitively determined regulation will satisfy
citizen preferences. The prediction has a normative implication for legal
and political theory: just as price competition disciplines producers of
private goods for the benefit of consumers, regulatory competition promises
to discipline government producers for the benefit of taxpaying citizens.
Two distinct benefits are said to follow - the distortions that result as
interest groups compete for, and win, political favors are ameliorated, and
incentives for innovative lawmaking are enhanced.
129
Regulatory competition has been brought to bear on the entire range
of federalism discussions, usually to support a devolutionary initiative or to
oppose a proposal for federal intervention. This is because the law as
product model implies a preference for decentralized regulation. The model
depicts central government as a cartel: just as collaboration among compet-
ing producers of products reduces price competition and incentives to
innovate, so the removal of regulatory subject matter to a central govern-
ment reduces the number of potential competitors and dilutes entrepreneur-
ial incentives. Furthermore, because the revenue enhancement constraint
on the national government is less intense,130 the national lawmaking pro-
cess will be slower, less responsive to productive concerns, and more
susceptible to the influence of organized interest groups.'
Regulatory competition theory applies to corporate law on the assump-
tion that state corporation codes are products for which reincorporating
128. Citizens signal their preferences respecting legal goods and services when they
migrate from regime to regime. Citizens' ability to exit disempowers government actors,
whose welfare diminishes as citizens depart, taking along votes and revenues. See Ronald
J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market,
36 McGILL L.J. 130, 142-43 (1991).
129. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 4-5 (1993).
130. Id. at 48.
131. Id. at 5.
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firms are the marginal consumers. 132 In the resulting description, competi-
tion for the legal business of firms forces the states to adapt the law to the
dynamic conditions in which the firms operate. State lawmaking emerges
as a trial and error process suited to the accurate identification of optimal
corporate arrangements. More particularly, reincorporating firms seek a
predictable legal regime that reduces their costs. Delaware, leading pro-
vider of corporate charters, provides predictability with comprehensive case
law, well-specified indemnification rules, and an expert judiciary."'
Reincorporating firms also seek a guarantee that the new state of domicile
will maintain the desirability of its code - the reincorporating firm and the
target jurisdiction enter into a relational contract that entails a risk of
opportunistic breach. Even as the firm invests to gain access to the target's
favorable legal regime, the target remains free to change its politics and to
transform itself into an unresponsive jurisdiction. The competitive jurisdic-
tion has to reduce this possibility by offering a credible commitment.
Delaware's commitment stems from its fiscal dependence on franchise tax
revenues.M These revenues are an intangible asset that results from the
combination of a large number of incorporations and a small population.
Delaware also invests in real assets specific to its incorporation business -
its case law and judicial and administrative expertise. These, together with
Delaware's corporation code, constitute reputational capital. 135 To protect
the capital, Delaware imposes internal process and structure rules that deter
political disruption.3 6
As originally articulated, this market-based race to the top validation
of state law bypassed the problem of the shareholders' lack of influence
over state lawmaking with a reference to the control market deterrent. The
assertion, in effect, was that managers' exit option adequately disciplined
the states while the possibility of shareholder exit by tender to a hostile
offeror adequately disciplined the managers. This story lost its persuasive-
ness when managers and state politicians collaborated'37 to hamper the
132. Id. at 6, 32.
133. Id. at 32, 33-34, 39 & n.20.
134. Id. at 37-39.
135. The store of capital bolsters Delaware's market position. Other states cannot
credibly precommit to offer superior service and thus are deterred from incurring the
necessary start-up costs. A first-mover advantage in Delaware results. Id. at 40-41, 43-44.
136. These rules include Delaware's direction of corporate matters to a specialized
chancery court, its practice of appointing rather than electing its judges and limiting them
to twelve-year terms, and its requirement of two-thirds majorities of both houses of its
legislature for the approval of corporation code amendments. Id. at 38-42.
137. Although this is interest group legislation, it did not result from the efforts of a
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market deterrent with the antitakeover legislation of the 1980s."' This
manifest case of charter market failure139 reinforced the assertion of the
system's opponents that, despite its competitive elements, it still allows
management to capture the states, with suboptimal results. Following the
lead of Roberta Romano,"4 the members of the market deterrent school
moved to a middle ground position on charter competition. 4' There they
defend the state system, except to the extent that it inhibits the control
market. Other commentators, all of whom also occupy middle ground
views, have taken the occasion to attack the state system and argue for
federal intervention.1 42 As usual, at the debate's bottom line lies the alloca-
centrally organized management lobbying effort. Romano's case study of the state legisla-
tive process suggested that the statutes are initiated by threatened managers of local corpora-
tions and their assistants in the local corporate bar rather than by broad coalitions of
business, labor, and community leaders. See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile
Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 461-62 & n.11 (1988).
138. For a summary, see ROMANO, supra note 129, at 53-57, 74-75.
139. A large body of empirical work confirms that the antitakeover statutes had a
harmful effect on shareholder value. This empirical result emerges from a complex picture
that encompasses the negative price effects of contractual antitakeover provisions such as
poison pills. For a summary, see id. at 60-67.
140. See Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle,
1 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 225 (1985).
141. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 222 (1991) (concluding that race to top stands as refuted,
but proposition that competition creates "powerful tendency" to enact shareholder beneficial
laws remains vital); Ralph K. Winter, "The Race for the Top" Revisited: A Comment on
Eisenberg, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1526, 1528 (1989) (expressing more confidence in incorrect-
ness of race to bottom view than in view that state competition results in race to top).
142. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1458-75 (1992).
Bebchuk argues that the middle-ground result stems from a structural defect in the competi-
tive system that disables the production of a maximizing legal regime. The market leads the
competing states to focus on the variables that influence reincorporation decisions. Id. at
1452-54. From this there follows a concern for management preferences rather than for
shareholder value. Accordingly, nothing deters the states from pursuing policies of manage-
ment accommodation respecting the fiduciary and market deterrents. Id. at 1462-63, 1468,
1488. Bebchuk concludes that much state takeover regulation should be preempted and
federal fiduciary standards should be imposed. Id. at 1494-95; see also David Charny,
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American
Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J.
423, 441-53 (1991); Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57
BROOK. L. REv. 55, 91-96 (1991); Joel Seligman, The Case for Minimum Corporate Law
Standards, 49 MD. L. REv. 947, 971-74 (1990); Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law,
59 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 60-63 (1993). New allegations of interest group capture also have
cropped up. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition,
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tion of the theoretical burden of proof for or against federal intervention.
Theoretical burdens of proof also show up at the bottom line when regula-
tory competition theory is drawn on to explain the proliferation of LLC
statutes. The inclusion of regulatory competition in the account of events
supports an inference of productivity, countering the negative signal sent by
the pro rata theory of limited liability.
B. Domestic Incentives: LLCs in an Island Jurisdiction
Hypothesize an island jurisdiction that makes available the corporate,
limited partnership and general partnership business forms and that taxes
income pursuant to a system identical to our federal tax system. Assume
that the taxing authority issues a new ruling that makes one-tier taxation
available to an incorporated partnership. The question is whether the
island-state's legislature can be expected to respond by enacting an LLC
statute. Assume further that the efficiency of the statute follows from a
relatively simple cost-benefit comparison: the costs are the costs of
externalized firm torts and the benefits stem from cost savings accruing to
firms organizing as LLCs and new capital formation induced by the form's
availability. Finally, make the public choice assumption that the legislature
is open to the influence of special interests and routinely enacts suboptimal
legislation in order to meet their demands and preferences.
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Sef-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1861 (1995), in which
we argue that capture of corporate law by the management interest operates across the 50
states and that regulatory competition exacerbates the problem, producing corporate codes
that block shareholder access to 'he corporate contract and justifying limited federal
intervention. Our interest group capture story complements and, to some extent, contrasts
with an antecedent description by Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller. See Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 498-509 (1987). Macey and Miller offer a supply-side account
that highlights the impact of internal interest group politics on the production of Delaware
law. Id. at 471-72. In their account, all groups within the state have a common interest in
producing a marketable legal regime, but the groups differ on the relative proportions of
costs imposed and revenues earned. The taxpayers have an interest in higher direct costs
(franchise tax revenues) and lower indirect costs (legal fees). The lawyers' interest in fees
would be served by lower direct costs leading to a greater number of incorporations and by
higher indirect legal costs even at the sacrifice of some incorporations to the extent that the
legal fees paid exceed those lost. Macey and Miller assert that, unlike Delaware, a state
acting as a pure profit maximizer would limit indirect costs so as to maximize direct costs.
Id. at 498. Delaware fails to conform to the product model's predictions because the bar
acts as a small, cohesive interest group that extracts special concessions from the legislature
at the expense of the general public. Id. at 504-08. For an extension of this story to the
broader context of choice of law, see generally Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and
Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. Coap. L. 999 (1994).
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1. Beneficiary Firs
Legislative authorization of LLCs holds out potential cost-saving
benefits for several classes of firms. 143 The first class is made up of exist-
ing partnerships for which incorporation is unduly costly due to the costs
and uncertainties of planning within the corporate form and Subchapter S.
The second class of firms contains existing Subchapter S corporations for
which long-term cost savings accrue in the event of reorganization as LLCs,
with the savings exceeding the cost of reorganization. 1" The third class
consists of future firms which, but for the LLC statute, would fall into one
of the first two classes.
Three additional classes of beneficiary firms can be suggested, but only
on a more speculative basis. The first class contains future firms that come
into existence in the LLC form, but that would never have come into
existence had the form not been available. The number of firms falling into
this category is likely to be quite small. To the extent that limited liability
and one-tier tax treatment are preconditions to these firms' existence,
Subchapter S incorporation would be available in any event at additional
cost. The class thus contains only firms for which the cost savings held out
by the LLC have a magnitude sufficient to induce new capital formation.
We suspect that, given a project of a value so marginal that the cost of
Subchapter S organization presents an insuperable barrier, the nontrivial
costs of organizing as an LLC also will present a significant deterrent. A
second and related class of beneficiaries consists of existing and future C
corporations that prefer one-tier tax status obtainable only through the LLC
form. This class, by definition, falls outside of the Subchapter S limita-
tions, presumably due to a large number of equity participants. Such a
large base of equity participants also would tend to preclude selection of the
partnership form. Presumably, the number of firms in this class is very
143. We stress the word "potential." The pattern of LLC usage in practice appears to
be more complex than one would predict based on an encounter with the cost-saving claims
of LLC enthusiasts. For example, start-up firms in which venture capitalists invest continue
to choose the corporate form, despite the two-tier tax treatment thereby entailed. See Joseph
Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1747-50
(1994). For a governance-based explanation, see Deborah A. DeMott, Agency and the
Unincorporated Firm: Reflections on Design on the Same Plane of Interest, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 595 (1997).
144. Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence
from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 428-30 (1995), collects numbers for organizations in
the LLC, limited partnership, and corporate firms in five states during the period 1988-
1994. Ribstein interprets the numbers to support an inference that actors have been
switching from the corporate and limited partnership form to the LLC form. Id. at 429.
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small, because the defining characteristics make the firms likely candidates
for organization as limited partnerships. With that point we identify a final
class of beneficiary firms - present limited partnerships for which long-
term cost savings will accrue in the event of reorganization as LLCs, with
the savings exceeding the cost of reorganization. Future firms that, but for
the LLC statute, would have organized as limited partnerships also fall into
this class.
2. Costs and Benefits
The beneficiaries of the legislation having been identified, we can
proceed to consider the island jurisdiction's cost-benefit calculation. An
LLC statute will be Kaldor-Hicks 45 efficient if the externalities suffered and
additional costs incurred as the result of its employment are outweighed by
the quantum of benefits from cost savings to firms and spillovers from
incremental capital formation accruing within the state. For the sake of
discussion, we will make a contrary cost-benefit assumption here - that is,
the costs externalized and incurred as the result of the increase in the
number of limited liability businesses are not trivial. From this point, there
ensues a complex cost-benefit comparison. Clear benefits accrue: first,
from the cost savings yielded for existing Subchapter S firms and second,
from spillovers from new businesses that otherwise would not be formed.
Things become less clear, however, when we turn our attention to the class
of partnerships that reorganize under the LLC statute. Here we have two
additional categories of social cost to consider. These businesses presum-
ably will incur additional transaction costs as they pursue limited liability
as LLCs. Also, because these firms are new to limited liability, it is
possible that LLC status will alter their incentives so that they now engage
in suboptimally risky new lines of business. By analogy, a technical
innovation that lowers the cost of evading detection for criminal conduct
leads to no overall gain for society. Accordingly, as to this class of firms,
any benefits result only from the productive aspects of new lines of business
taken up after reorganization as LLCs that would not have been taken up
had LLC organization been unavailable.
So to raise with clarity the political issue implicated by LLC legisla-
tion, we will stipulate a cost-benefit result: the enactment of the LLC statute
is inefficient. Accordingly, if the public interest is the state legislature's
sole concern, there will be no LLC statute. But because public choice
assumptions are made here, the question as to enactment remains open.
145. That is, aggregate economic welfare will increase, although there will be losers
as well as winners.
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3. Interest Groups
Will the island-state's legislature enact an LLC statute? Projection of
an answer to this question requires us to specify the pro and con interests
and to project their likely influence on legislative results.
First and foremost on the pro side are the business lawyers. They
have a high-powered incentive to persuade the legislature to enact the
statute in order to increase fee revenues. There appears to be one-period
pent-up demand that the lawyers can satisfy,"4 stemming from the existing
inventory of partnerships, limited partnerships, and corporations that will
opt to transfer to LLC status. In subsequent periods, the lawyers presum-
ably gain to the extent that new firms that otherwise would organize as
partnerships choose the more formal and more expensive LLC form and
also benefit to the extent of new capital formation. 147 But the lawyers will
lose to the extent that firms that otherwise would organize as more expen-
sive corporations or limited partnerships choose the LLC form."4t The
lawyers will have no problem in mobilizing to procure the legislation.
Their bar associations routinely step in to solve problems of collective
action respecting enactment of beneficial legislation, serving the drafting
function as well as the lobbying function.149 Organized small business
interests conceivably could join the lawyers in the lobbying process. Both
voices, thus organized, would serve as a proxy for the voice of any present
and potential outside investors in small firms.
There are three possible voices that might be heard on the opposition
side. The first is the state treasurer to the extent that the LLC implies
revenue losses. However, the extent of any such losses would not appear
to be significant. Any income tax consequences would be trivial because
most corporate candidates for LLC reorganization presumably already
would be Subchapter S taxpayers, and one-tier treatment also will have
been the rule for all partnership and limited partnership candidates for LLC
formation."15 Nor should the franchise tax revenue present a problem. If
146. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives
to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 745, 747-69 (1995).
147. Id. at 759-69.
148. We have heard informally from practitioners in two different states that the LLC
form is most widely employed for single-purpose real estate acquisition vehicles having a
single equityholder. With the LLC, counsel can just file a piece of paper, skipping the
additional step of producing a needless set of bylaws.
149. Cf. William J. Carney, Federalism and Corporate Law: A Non-Delaware View of
the Results of Competition, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINA-
TION 157-61 (William Bratton et al. eds., 1996).
150. Moreover, if the Silicon Valley experience is any guide, some potential LLCs will
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franchise taxes for LLCs are set at a level comparable to that already
existing for close corporations, the treasurer should experience a net gain
as untaxed partnerships convert to LLC form and become franchise taxpay-
ers. The second candidate for the opposition role is the banks. To the
extent that limited liability presents a contracting barrier, the statute will
disable them from contracting back to their ex ante position of security
respecting small-business lending.'' But because banks can adjust the cost
of credit to make up for this and diversify the additional risk, one would
not expect banks to expend financial resources and political capital on an
opposition campaign." The third potential class of objectors is the tort
plaintiffs' bar. Here, participation in the political process would depend on
a cognizable division of labor 53 between business lawyers and plaintiffs'
litigators. Even given such a division of labor, the business lawyers would
appear to have the more high-powered incentive. Business lawyers would
be going after the near-term reward of fees generated by pent-up demand.
In contrast, income reduction to the plaintiffs' lawyers stemming from the
difficulty of collecting judgments against LLCs amounts to a distant period
problem and, as a result, may appear speculative in the present. Indeed,
the likelihood of loss might rationally be discounted on a number of
grounds. Individual defendants could be identified in many cases,154 and
the remedy of veil-piercing might provide some compensation."~ In addi-
tion, to the extent that the expansion of limited liability attracts assets to
risky endeavors, the volume of tort litigation will rise, with recoveries out
of corporate assets in those cases offsetting losses from unsatisfied judg-
ments in others. Finally, because the incentives of the tort plaintiffs' bar
have themselves become a political issue, a perceived need to husband
political capital for opposition to more threatening future legislative initia-
tives might counsel silence here, even given a perceived impairment of
organize as C corporations despite the tax disadvantage. See Bankman, supra note 143, at
1747-50.
151. Booth, supra note 46, at 157-61.
152. Contract creditors unaware that firms were shifting to limited liability status in
quantity might suffer surprise losses. See Saul Levmore, Partnerships, Limited Liability
Companies, and Taxes: A Comment on the Survival of Organizational Forms, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 489, 491-92 (1992). Obviously creditors so positioned would not be players in a
political process.
153. Note that a complete division of labor among individual business lawyers and tort
litigators need not result in a visible division of interest on the part of the bar if the two
types of lawyers practice together in firms.
154. See Booth, supra note 46, at 154-57.
155. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 8-9 (suggesting that corporate veil-piercing on
general equitable principles should apply equally to LLCs).
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interest. In all, then, the organized plaintiffs' bar serves as a decidedly
imperfect proxy for the interest of an inchoate class of future tort victims.
It accordingly is plausible to project complete silence respecting tort
victims' interest in the political process respecting LLCs.
4. Predicted Result
Comparison and weighing of the competing interests, thus described,
supports a projection of prompt enactment of an LLC statute. Here we tell
a "just so" story, of course. The historical proliferation of LLC legislation
has been attributed to the initiative of state bar committees rather than to the
initiative of the legislators themselves. 156  State treasurers, if they have
objected behind the scenes, have been overruled. The banks and the
plaintiffs' bars appear to have taken no interest in the matter. Thus, in
practice, the business lawyers' high-powered incentives appear to have
carried the day.
Note that in our hypothetical island-state the law of business forms
very much is product - domestic product. The local bar procures the
legislation in order to access and satisfy an existing client demand. Yet,
significantly, nothing in this law as product description provides the slight-
est assurance that the legislation is efficient. Indeed, in the confines of the
model here, the supply-side interest procures the legislation in the usual
manner of interest group capture and the demand being satisfied stems in
part from a perverse incentive to externalize accident costs.
It also should be noted that the alignment of incentives in the island-
state makes it likely that innovation respecting the terms of the LLC form
will continue in the period following enactment. The legal practitioners can
learn the particulars of the statute's effects only on a trial and error basis
over time. As they do so, one would expect to see amendment of the
legislation. This presumably suboptimal incentive to innovate follows from
the business lawyers' interest in maximizing fee revenues. Recall that one
of the main sources - perhaps even the primary source - of fee revenues
from LLC organization lies in firms that, but for the LLC statute, would
organize as partnerships due to the prohibitive costs and uncertainties
attending corporate organization under Subchapter S. An implication of
extreme cost sensitivity arises on the part of these firms. Limited liability
has a value to them, but they opt in only if the cost is minimal. Given such
discriminating consumers, we can expect the business bar to invest in close
156. Id. at 4; see also Ribstein, supra note 142, at 1008-12 (explaining that in "non-
corporate" situations holding no cognizable franchise tax yield for state, legislators will not
have incentives to innovate).
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monitoring of the operation of the LLC statute. Because complexity is
involved, there is no reason to expect that the bar associations' (and legis-
latures') first-round draft of the statute will best satisfy client demand.
Rounds of revision will be needed to achieve the maximum possible satis-
faction of client demand for lowest cost organizational terms. As the statute
is improved through amendment, the class of firms for which LLC organi-
zation is beneficial expands, with the bar experiencing the reward of higher
revenues. Here again we tell a "just so" story: the prevailing forms of
LLC statutes have evolved dynamically in the course of their short
history. 157
C. Incentives to Race to the Bottom: LLCs in a Federal System
with a Rule of Siege Rel
It has been suggested that the states' rapid movement to enact LLC
statutes cannot be described as a race to the bottom for the reason that a
downward corporate race can only occur given a separation of ownership
and control.158 However, this suggestion misses a point. If a given legisla-
tive enactment causes costs to be incurred in other states, then a race to the
bottom always is a structural possibility. Thus, to the extent that the costs
of limited liability are felt outside of the state providing the business form,
a race to the bottom could occur when multiple states expand the availabil-
ity of limited liability.
We model such a race to externalize below. The pattern of regulatory
competition that informs the model follows from conditions quite distinct
from those that determine the familiar corporate law race of charter-mon-
gering jurisdictions. To underscore this difference, our model assumes a
federal system in which charter-mongering is precluded by a siage reel
choice of law rule. In other words, firms must be chartered in the state in
which most of their assets are situated. Although the exercise shows that
a race to the bottom is a structural possibility, we conclude that this theoret-
ical race is very unlikely to have figured into the proliferation of LLC
statutes across the states.
1. Regulatory Races to the Bottom - Externalities, Preferences,
and Prisoner's Dilemmas
Regulatory competition theory recognizes two exceptions to its pre-
sumption favoring state-level lawmaking. First, the federal government has
157. See Ribstein, supra note 144, at 412-28.
158. See Macey, supra note 14, at 442-43.
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to keep state borders open if factor and citizen mobility is to bring competi-
tive discipline to regulation at the state level.159 Second, pursuant to the
command that the scope of regulation should match the domain of its costs
and benefits, the federal government has to police interstate externalities." °
Competing governments have an incentive to regulate in order to facilitate
cross-border cost externalization by their citizens. This occurs, for exam-
ple, when a jurisdiction makes an exception in its environmental law for a
given type of pollution knowing that prevailing winds blow the permitted
particles across the border. Here, not only does the producer externalize
a cost, but those affected by the externality have no voice as to its regula-
tion and get no chance to trade sufferance of the pollution for higher
incomes.
Cross-border externalities, then, invite races to the bottom across
multiple states, with either federal intervention or interstate governmental
cooperation being justified as a remedy.16' Choice of law behavior in
products liability litigation has been presented to argue such a case. 1 2 The
key to this argument, as articulated by Michael McConnell, lies in the
problem of synchronizing local preferences respecting levels of product
liability with supply and demand conditions in a national product market.
Because each state's manufacturers price and sell on a national basis,
individual states have an incentive to set a higher level of product liability
protection than they would set as island jurisdictions. The federal system
thus allows states to satisfy local plaintiffs at the expense of foreign manu-
facturers and causes free-riding on states that legislate lower levels of
protection. Downward adjustment of the level of liability does local manu-
facturers little good and forces local plaintiffs to incur the cost of finding
alternative jurisdictions in which to sue. Says McConnell, we accordingly
159. Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European Business Law, 14 INT'L R v. L.
& ECON. 125, 129-30 (1994).
160. Id. at 127.
161. Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness,
102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2098 (1993).
162. See Michael W. McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach to Products Liability
Reform, in NEw DIMECTIONS IN LABILrrY LAW 90, 91-92, 97-100 (W. Olson ed., 1988);
see also Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24
GA. L. REV. 49, 89 (1989). But cf. Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition
in the Product Liability System, 80 GEO. L.J. 617, 617-18, 651-52 (1992) (arguing that
states have dual incentive - to attract investment with manufacturer-favorable liability rules
and to skew their choice of law rules in directions favorable to individual local plaintiffs
suing foreign manufacturers - and that therefore incentive picture is more complicated than
in McConnell's presentation and thus counsels caution respecting federalization of product
liability system).
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tend to see downward adjustments of liability levels only where both costs
and benefits are felt locally - medical malpractice and municipal liability
being examples. With products liability, McConnell argues, the downward
race to set high levels of liability requires federal level adjustment.163
Races to externalize, as hypothesized by McConnell, comprise a subset
in the range of race to the.bottom situations debated in the literature. Some
important points of distinction should be noted. Consider, by way of
contrast, the famous race to the bottom argument advanced to justify the
federalization of environmental law.1 That argument presupposes no
cross-border pollution. The argument instead focuses on the internal state
politics of environmental regulation, asserting that local factors of produc-
tion exercise a distortive influence when they threaten to relocate in the
wake of stepped-up regulation. The argument is that competition for new
factors of production among the states leaves them in a prisoner's dilemma
respecting environmental standards. Each state is deterred from promulgat-
ing standards at its preferred level of strictness by the threat of a loss of
production factors to a defecting competing state. The more intense the
competition for factors, the greater the disparity between the level of envir-
onmental protection desired by the public and the level evolving in practice.
Furthermore, given a large number of states, the transaction costs of
collective action will prevent coordination. The prisoner's dilemma accord-
ingly ripens into a commons dilemma calling for a federal level solution."
Regulatory competition proponents have mounted a strong attack on the
assumptions underlying this prisoner's dilemma story. The prisoner's
dilemma set up, they say, depends on the assumption that the multiple
jurisdictions have fixed preferences for strict regulation, each believing that
the subject matter should not be one for cost-benefit tradeoffs. Competition
for factors and collective action problems then undermine the jurisdictions'
163. McConnell, supra note 162, at 91-92.
164. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212
(1977); Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional
Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act,
62 IowA L. REv. 713, 714-22 (1977).
165. Revesz restates that the prisoner's dilemma occurs in a two-party framework,
showing that when a player has two strategies, lax and strict, a suboptimal lax strategy will
strongly dominate the optimal stringent strategy. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environ-
mental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1216-17, 1229-33 (1992). The suboptimal lax
strategy is a unique equilibrium and always will be selected. Note also that given 50 states,
cooperation through mutual forbearance is unlikely to evolve even given infinite repetition
of the game. Hay, supra note 162, at 625-26.
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ability to adhere to the stated policy, leading to a suboptimal result. 6 A
more realistic set up, say the critics, would depict the situation differently:
in a world of scarce resources, cost-benefit tradeoffs between levels of
regulation and income are inevitable, and no a priori fixed preference for
a given level of regulation should be assumed. Without fixed preferences
across jurisdictions, higher payoffs through federalization or interstate
cooperation cannot be assumed, and a prisoner's dilemma is not inevitable.
Although it is in theory possible that absolute, normatively based prefer-
ences, whether for stricter environmental rules or some other form of
regulation, could exist across jurisdictions, this is asserted to be very
unlikely as a practical matter. 67 A prisoner's dilemma characterization
remains structurally appropriate, however, in cases in which negative
externalization drives the lawmaking strategy. 68 The model that follows
falls into this category.
2. Racing to Externalize with Limited Liability
(a) Low trade scenario. We begin by returning to our island jurisdic-
tion.169 As before, larger firms endure two-tier taxation, but enjoy limited
liability. For simplicity, we assume that all smaller firms are organized as
partnerships because of the high expense of incorporation. We also drop
our public choice assumption and instead stipulate that the jurisdiction's
government devote itself to the maximization of the welfare of its citizens.
The jurisdiction has altered its income tax regime to extend the availability
of one-tier taxation, and its legislature now has to decide whether to enact
an LLC statute. The legislature correctly ascertains the value of the present
system of small-firm unlimited liability to be 100 - the sum of the value
of extra compensation to tort victims, transaction cost savings, and foregone
investment in unproductively risky ventures. The cost of this unlimited
liability system is 80 - the sum of the negative value of foregone invest-
ment in productive ventures and the deadweight extra costs incurred by
firms that incorporate but that would not do so in a regime making limited
liability less expensive. On these numbers, the legislature, immune as it is
to the ministrations of interest groups, will not enact an LLC statute.
166. Revesz, supra note 165, at 1219-24.
167. Stewart, supra note 161, at 2058-59. For a strong rebuttal, see Brian A., Langille,
Competing Conceptions of Regulatory Competition in Debates on Trade Liberalization and
Labour Standards, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION,
supra note 149, at 479, 479-90.
168. See Hay, supra note 162, at 625-26.
169. See supra text preceding note 143.
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Now let us change the facts and place the island jurisdiction in a feder-
ation of four identical states. As stated, the rule of si~ge rel prevails.
But, as in our interstate corporate system, each state must recognize corpo-
rations formed in other states. Trade and interstate contact are spread
evenly across the jurisdictions' geographies and are enjoyed on a pro rata
basis by all firms. The level of trade is such that some of the benefits of
each state's unlimited liability regime are felt in three other states. Specifi-
cally, 90% of the benefits accrue to local residents and firms, while 10%
of the benefits accrue to out-of-state residents and firms. All of the costs
of the regime are incurred by local businesses and citizens. Because the
legislature of each state cares only about the welfare of its own citizens, the
externalized benefits have no bearing on the legislative cost-benefit calcula-
tion. Yet no shift in favor of LLCs results on these numbers. Although
the costs of an LLC statute now amount to only 90 of foregone benefits of
unlimited liability, the LLC statute's benefits remain fixed at 80. Because
we are in a world of siege rel, no state's preference calculation can be
influenced by the possibility of setting up shop as a charter-mongerer that
draws benefits from pent-up demand for LLC status across the four states.
If any one state enacts an LLC statute, foreign corporations wishing to take
advantage literally will have to pick up stakes and move their assets. Such
capital movement seems unlikely because incorporation is available in each
of the four states for any firm willing to pay the incremental cost.
(b) Significant trade scenario. Now let us examine the incentives of
each of the four states in a different scenario. We go from a low trade
scenario at t = 0 to t = 1 at which interstate trade has picked up substan-
tially and makes up a more significant proportion of the gross product of
each state. The increased level of trade is such that 70% of the benefits of
unlimited liability are felt at home, and 30 % are felt outside, distributed as
an even 10 to each other state. As before, all costs of unlimited liability
are felt at home by local businesses.
Assume further that State A fortuitously adjusts its corporate tax system
at t = 1 to make one-tier treatment available to all small firms whatever
their form and, as a result, rethinks its policy respecting limited liability.
State A has a short-term incentive to take the first-mover role respecting an
LLC statute. The local benefits of unlimited liability are 70, and costs are
80. And, because the benefits of unlimited liability are the costs of limited
liability, the state can export 30 of the costs of the shift, provided of course
that none of the other states make the same move.
State A thus enacts an LLC statute at t = 1. We now look at the
situation from the point of view of the legislature of State B at t = 2. State
B experiences 70 of benefits from unlimited liability and bears 80 of costs.
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In addition, it bears 10 of additional costs of limited liability exported by
State A. Standing pat thus leaves State B in a loss situation. If it enacts an
LLC statute, it will receive benefits of 80, incur local costs of 70, and
export 30 of costs to the other three states. Of those exported costs, 10 will
go to State A, offsetting the 10 of costs coming from State A. Netting all
of this out, an LLC statute will be a wash for State B, yielding 80 of
benefits against 70 of local costs and 10 of costs coming from State A in
any event. If States C and D do not act, enactment of the LLC statute is
the maximizing move for State B.
The problem, of course, is that States C and D are doing the same
analysis at t = 2. If all three states enact LLC statutes, they will get the
following result: each of the four states will gain 80 in benefits of limited
liability, incur 70 of local costs, export 30 of costs, and import 30 of costs,
for a total cost of 100. This situation clearly is suboptimal because, as
island jurisdictions, none would prefer the limited liability regime. Absent
an opportunity for coordination across the states, this also would appear to
be the equilibrium result, because each of States B, C, and D has a sucker
payoff to worry about. If, say, State B stands pat and States C and D enact
LLC statutes, State B ends up in a worst case situation, experiencing 70 in
local benefits, 80 in local costs, and an additional 30 in costs exported from
the other states for a total cost of 110. On the other hand, if coordination
among the states is feasible, States B, C, and D could mutually agree to
stand pat. 70 This leaves each with 80 of benefits and 90 of costs for a
deficit of 10 - a result superior to the deficit of 30 resulting from uncoor-
dinated enactment of LLC statutes. Of course, if the agreement to stand pat
cannot be enforced, there will remain an incentive to defect on the part of
each state so as to pick up 10 of benefits. The first-best result, however,
comes only as the result of intervention by the federal government to bar
all four states from extending the availability of limited liability.
A question arises about the incentives of the first mover, State A.
Given that its initial adoption of an LLC statute creates the possibility of a
suboptimal equilibrium at t = 2, why would it move in the first place?
Two reasons can be suggested. First, given information asymmetries and
the vagaries of political processes, the time lapse between the first and
second periods might be long - long enough to make first movement
optimal given a high discount rate on the part of State A's politicians and
the possibility of interstate coordination in a later period. Second, if State
A is lucky, States B, C, and D will coordinate to stand pat, leaving State A
on a first-best free ride.
170. The stand pat result also might emerge as a focal point equilibrium.
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(c) Imbalanced trade scenarios. Let us try one further scenario to
illustrate the possibility that State A can succeed with a scheme to external-
ize. All we have to do is give State A a special reason to take the first-
mover role. Specifically, State A contains the federation's largest city and
business center. As a result, the benefits of limited liability to State A are
100, although the benefits remain at 80 for the other states. On these
numbers, there is no reason for State A either to refrain from enacting an
LLC statute or to cooperate with the other states.
We get a variation on this theme if we stipulate benefits of limited
liability at an even 80 across all four states, but then accord State A a 70-30
split between internal and external benefits, and accord each of States B, C,
and D a 90-10 split between internal and external benefits. That is, citizens
from States B, C, and D go to the big city in State A to do business, but the
volume both of citizens going out of State A to do business and the volume
of traffic between the other three states inter se is much lower. On these
numbers, State A has every incentive to externalize. At t = 2, if each of
the other states stands pat, each will have an unlimited liability benefit of
90, a local unlimited liability cost of 80, and an externalized cost of 10 that
it cannot avert. If the states enact LLC statutes, they will each have a
limited liability cost of 90, a limited liability benefit of 80, and a burden of
externalized costs in excess of 10, assuming that each spreads some of its
trade around the group of three other states. 171 Doing nothing thus is the
superior strategy, and State A's move does not prompt a race to the bottom.
3. Summary
Generally, then, the higher the level of interstate contacts and trade,
(a) the wider the spread between the benefits and costs of liability and
unlimited liability in each state, and (b) the more likely it is that a given
state will have an incentive to move to a limited liability regime from a
position of unlimited liability in order to effect externalization of the costs
of limited liability. Given such a first move, a race to the bottom among
the remaining states in the federation may or may not ensue, depending on
the cost-benefit posture of each state.
That having been said, it appears very, unlikely that desire to external-
ize costs of limited liability on the part of individual states has played a
causative role in the proliferation of LLC statutes. Because we tend to deal
with small firms here, we also deal for the most part with local costs and
benefits. The posture might be different if the subject was an extension of
171. Even if each of the three states does all of its trading with State A, the enactment
of an LLC statute leaves it in a negative situation with costs of 100 and benefits of 80.
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the availability of limited liability for the benefit of large corporations doing
business in the national market.
D. Incentives to Race to the Top: LLCs in a Federal System
We here stay with our hypothetical federal system, but change a
number of assumptions. First, we abandon the rule of siege rel, making
it possible for firms to incorporate in any state despite the location of their
assets. Second, we revert to the public choice framework and assume that
there obtains in each state the interest group alignment described above for
an island jurisdiction. Third, we initially assume that there is no uncer-
tainty respecting recognition of foreign LLCs in any state in the federation
(an assumption we later relax)." And, fourth, we add a fifth state modeled
on Delaware: State E is smaller in area and population than the other four
and has made a successful business of attracting the chartering business of
large, publicly held firms. We look at the five jurisdictions three times.
First comes t = 0, when the federal government alters its tax system to
allow one-tier treatment for incorporated firms matching the description of
LLCs; second comes t = 1, some years later, when all five jurisdictions
have LLC statutes; third comes the period after t = 1 and before t = 2 that
occurs several years later still. Here is the question for discussion: is there
any basis to conclude that regulatory competition plays a significant caus-
ative role either in the first appearance of an LLC statute immediately after
t = 0, in the proliferation of LLC statutes between t = 0 and t = 1, or
in the ongoing maintenance and modification of the LLC regime between
t = 1 and t = 2?
1. Corporate Charter Competition as a Model for the
Period Between t = 1 and t = 2
We will begin with the period between t = 1 and t = 2 and inquire as
to the likelihood that the pattern of corporate law charter competition will
be replicated with respect to LLCs. Historically speaking, charter competi-
tion began after general incorporation statutes already had proliferated
across the states - in effect ex post t = 1. We accordingly begin with the
end period as we explore the possibility of direct application of the corpo-
rate charter competition model to LLCs. Under the charter competition
model, State E would take the first-mover role respecting improvements in
172. Here we assume away a possible barrier to regulatory competition respecting
LLCs. LLC proliferation in the federal system occurred despite a slight degree of uncer-
tainty respecting recognition of foreign firms. See Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by
Contract, 18 J. CoRP. L. 245, 250 (1993).
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the LLC form, amending its LLC statute with a view to attracting registra-
tion fees and legal business from the other four states.
The question as to whether we plausibly can project replication of this
charter competition pattern in the LLC context can be asked in two forms,
one narrow and the other broad. The narrow question is whether we can
expect a literal repetition. It admits of a clear answer: no. Two reasons
can be cited, one lying on the supply-side and the other lying on the
demand-side: State E's government has little financial incentive to compete
for LLC business; at the same time, costs constrain the migratory options
of small firms suited to organize as LLCs. The broad question is, despite
the absence of conditions supporting literal repetition, whether some out-of-
state LLC business may find its way to State E, with actors in the state
having incentives to shape its legal environment so as to attract that busi-
ness. Here a more equivocal answer is yielded: possibly.
(a) The narrow question. We address the question about exact replica-
tion by looking first at the supply-side incentive picture. Firms opting to
become LLCs tend to be small firms, and small firms historically have been
excluded from descriptions of charter competition. Close corporation
charters, even when registered in quantity, provide only insignificant
revenues to the chartering state. Delaware keys its franchise tax rates to
the size of the chartered firm. The resulting revenue figures for close
corporations contribute only a minor portion of the state's revenue draw.'7
The Delaware legislature, accordingly, has only a weak financial incentive
to compete for small-firm business.
The charter competition analogy also fails to carry over to the demand
side of the incentive picture. As noted above, firms reincorporate in
Delaware to obtain comprehensive case law, well-specified indemnification
rules, and an expert judiciary. 7 Historically, these benefits have justified
the costs of the move in the case of larger firms, either because the firms
plan merger and acquisition transactions or, more generally, have a concern
about shareholder litigation.175 Because small firms have only a limited
need for these services, they historically have tended to find that the costs
of foreign incorporation outweigh the benefits. Nothing in the nature of the
LLC provides a basis for a different projection. One would expect a strong
incentive for foreign organization to arise only if a given home state pro-
vided a negative incentive, whether because it enacted a statute that failed
173. See Ayres, supra note 13, at 373.
174. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
175. See RoMANo, supra note 129, at 37-48; see also Macey, supra note 14, at 444-46
(arguing that LLCs do not replicate publicly held corporate fact pattern).
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to meet the demand of local firms in some material respect or because it
failed to enact any statute at all. And even in these cases, it would not be
immediately clear that the costs and benefits favored foreign organization
as an LLC. Recall, from the demand picture set out above for an island
jurisdiction, that we for the most part deal here with a class of small firms
as to which the costs of Subchapter S corporate organization loom so large
that unlimited liability in the partnership form is the preferred alternative.
The degree of transaction cost sensitivity thereby implicated makes foreign
organization an unlikely first choice even in the case of a suboptimal
domestic statutory provision. Incorporation in a foreign state costs the firm
more because it results in two franchise taxes and two sets of compliance
costs instead of one. 76 Whatever the benefits held out by superior foreign
codes and dispute-resolution regimes, they have not historically outweighed
the costs for close corporations. This demand-side pattern should continue
to obtain with LLCs.
The failure of the strict charter competition analogy should come as no
surprise to anyone familiar with charter market's structure. Although it is
fair to speak in terms of a charter "market," that market does not function
as a sort of Middle Eastern souk in which fifty states set up booths in a
small space, and corporate consumers go from booth to booth comparing
product quality and haggling over price. Instead, only one state, Delaware,
competes for charters on a national basis. Its capture of about half of the
available volume has enabled it to develop an expertise in sophisticated
corporate dispute resolution that cannot easily be replicated by a com-
petitor."7 Given convergence among the states as to the terms of corporate
codes, the possibility of easy replication of any statutory innovations by
Delaware and the difficulty and expense of replicating Delaware's dispute
resolution expertise, 17 no other state has had an incentive to invest in entry
into active competition. Thus, interest group influence in the separate
states, rather than regulatory competition, can be drawn on to provide an
explanation for the phenomenon of fast diffusion of innovative code provi-
sions across the states.
179
176. The firm also opens itself to suit in two states instead of one. Ayres, supra note
13, at 374-75.
177. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 142, at 1893-95.
178. Cf. Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies and Competitive Federalism: Lessons from
Patents, Yachting, and Bluebooks, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND
COORDINATION, supra note 149, at 239, 241-46 (suggesting that absence of intellectual
property protection for innovators will lead to suboptimal charter competition).
179. Carney, supra note 149, at 172-82.
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(b) The broad question. The absence of conditions necessary for
replication of the corporate charter market does not imply the complete
absence of competitive behavior respecting LLCs in the period after t = 1.
To the extent that firms with substantial capitalizations choose the LLC
form, it is not implausible to project that lawyers in State E, Delaware in
our hypothetical federation, can succeed in skimming a little cream from the
other states.
In making this projection, we look to Delaware's bench and bar for
supply-side incentives. The Delaware bench maintains a national reputation
as a center for resolution of complex business disputes, and the Delaware
bar draws rents from the resulting flow of litigation business."8° LLCs,
taken by analogy to close corporations, could provide some additional liti-
gation volume. Some out-of-state close corporations organize in Delaware,
despite the standard cost-benefit recommendation against Delaware situs for
small firms. 8' A cognizable number of cases respecting Delaware close
corporations have been reported over the decades. 1" These firms thus add
value to the state even though they do not contribute a substantial portion
of its franchise tax draw, and there is every reason to expect the Delaware
bar to pay close attention to the shaping and reshaping of the state's LLC
statute with a view to catching any parallel LLC business. This is not a
high-powered incentive - here any present investment in legislative draft-
ing looks toward a speculative and sporadic return on the litigation side.
But a high-powered incentive may not be needed. One suspects that the
180. State policy to expand the volume of this business is manifested in Delaware's
contractual choice of law statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708(a),(c) (1993). For
discussion, see Ribstein, supra note 142, at 1003-07.
181. This point is strongly implied by raw numbers of Delaware incorporations. In
1994, for example, there were 44,762 new incorporations in Delaware. See Joe Fulgham
& Kimberly Quillen, Keeping Businesses in Delaware, DEL. Bus. REV., Dec. 4, 1995, at
1. In 1996, the total number of active Delaware incorporations was 270,000. Kimberly
Quillen, Entrepreneurial Woman of the Year: Carolyn E. McKown, DEL. Bus. REV., Oct.
28, 1996, at 2. No doubt a large number of these firms were not out-of-state close corpora-
tions. They might, for example, be either (a) publicly traded firms organized in other states
migrating to Delaware, (b) subsidiaries of existing publicly traded Delaware firms,
(c) subsidiaries of publicly traded firms organized in other states, or (d) domestic close
corporations. But it nonetheless seems highly likely that these large numbers include a
cognizable number of out-of-state close corporations.
182. See, e.g., Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232 (Del. 1982); Oceanic Explora-
tion Co. v. Grynberg, 428 A.2d 1 (Del. 1981); Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined
Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947); Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800 (Del. Ch.
1966);. Interestingly, the Delaware courts have taken a distinct antifiduciary posture in
disposing of some issues presented in close corporation cases. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626
A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993).
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requisite investment of time carries a correspondingly low cost, and the
returns, although sporadic, would accrue across a long-term.
Turning to the supply side, the class of potential customers for Dela-
ware LLC organization presumably would have attributes parallel to those
of its close corporation customers. Several attributes readily suggest them-
selves. These must be firms as to which transaction cost penny-pinching
is not a primary concern, so that the lawyer has discretion to pursue a first-
best legal regime. One suspects that such a firm would engage a large law
firm. Lawyers at that large law firm might opt for Delaware LLC situs out
of dissatisfaction with the local LLC statute. Alternatively, Delaware
organization might be indicated when litigation is foreseeable, as might be
the case when parties in interest conduct complex negotiations over conflict
of interest points, or when, absent such negotiation, the lawyer nonetheless
identifies nascent conflicts. As already noted, the Delaware bar has every
incentive to craft an LLC statute that signals sensitivity to the interests of
such marginal firms.
Having thus hypothesized a national role for Delaware, and hence State
E, in the organization of LLCs, the question arises whether this implies a
law development path paralleling that of corporate law, with Delaware
taking the role of prime mover respecting LLC statutory and case law.
Such a scenario is very unlikely because there is no apparent source of
responsive competitive pressure in the other states. Here any litigation
business is lost as a result of Delaware's standing reputation as a dispute
resolution center, an attraction that cannot be copied, at least not at a low
cost. And, because out-of-state lawyers routinely join Delaware lawyers on
Delaware-based litigation, the litigation loss is far from total in the eyes of
out-of-state lawyers. Organization business, meanwhile, need not be lost
at all so far as they are concerned. One of the factors that has assured
Delaware's success as a charter competitor has been its laws' availability
to lawyers nationwide - it is the custom for out-of-state corporate lawyers
to form Delaware corporations and give Delaware opinions on due incorpo-
ration and corporate authority to enter into transactions. The out-of-state
organizing lawyer thereby views Delaware as a choice rather than as a
threat. For a source of continuing incentives to improve the local LLC
statute, we are better off looking to domestic concerns, as the discussion
that follows will show.
• 2. Incentives for the First-Mover State at t = 0
The incentive picture changes only- slightly when we change our
temporal perspective and survey the five state federation at t = 0. Here the
question is whether it plausibly can be hypothesized that the first LLC
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statute will be enacted by a state seeking to take a prime-mover advantage
and draw on all five states for LLC business. Such a scenario is implausi-
ble assuming a modicum of rationality on the part of each state's actors and
an awareness of the history respecting corporate charter competition.
Because the other states are free to copy the first-mover's statute,lu the
time window for a first-mover advantage must be short, too short to permit
the first mover to develop any less easily replicated expertise that might
preserve its leading position over time. First movement with a view to out-
of-state business thus is only plausible given a high projected flow of out-
of-state fees during the period of time advantage or given some special (and
enduring) advantage on the first-mover's part. Significantly, the latter
situation of special advantage has figured into the history of charter compe-
tition. Delaware's small population enabled its emergence as the chartering
jurisdiction: it credibly could commit to serve the needs of large corpora-
tions without a risk of local political interference because, given its small
size, charter revenues make up a substantial portion of its total tax
receipts." Something comparable might be present here if, for example,
the interest group alignment in the other four states disfavored LLC legisla-
tion. But, as we saw when considering incentives in an island jurisdiction,
such an unfavorable political climate cannot plausibly be projected. But if
the first mover does not seek foreign business, how can we account for the
appearance of the first LLC statute? If the first-mover state is not State E,
then the above description of the incentives of an island jurisdiction pro-
vides an answer. Domestic as opposed to foreign demand plus the local
bar's pecuniary interest in satisfying that demand together explain first
movement. Foreign demand would figure in only as a low probability
upside factor - an extra splash of gravy on a loaded plate. Such a factor
certainly could come into the first-mover's cost-benefit analysis. But no
implication of determinative influence arises thereby.
Further to this point, consider the possibility that State E could take the
first-mover role as a means to the end of adding litigation business. Given
our assumption of certain recognition of foreign LLCs in states without an
LLC statute, that possibility at least must be conceded. But if we relax the
assumption and admit a small risk of nonrecognition between t = 0 and
t = 1, the State E incentive picture changes radically. Now State E law-
makers may project that conservative counsel in States A to D would advise
that any State E organization be in the corporate form pending termination
of the risk of nonrecognition by means of domestic enactment of LLC
183. Ayres, supra note 178, at 241-46.
184. ROMANO, supra note 129, at 6-12.
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legislation. They furthermore might ask themselves whether State E's
interests are served at all by first movement respecting a novel business
form. That very novelty, coupled with the prospect of easy replication by
the legislatures of other states, creates a risk of dissipation of the value of
its accumulated experience and consequent business loss. In this scenario,
then, State E is the least likely first mover due to the combination of a
vested interest in the status quo and a low level of domestic demand.
3. Incentives to Copy Between t = 0 and t = 1
The same domestic demand factors that best account for the actions of
the prime mover also come to bear in explaining the actions of the other
states during the period of proliferation of LLC statutes. One can plausibly
model the statues' rapid diffusion as a sequence of domestic events, without
any reference to interstate competition. Simply, the organized bar of each
state invests in securing the legislation in pursuit of domestic revenues.
Note that nothing in this description denies the appropriateness of the law
as product analogy. Law is as much product here as it is in the charter
competition model. Here, however, cost advantages enjoyed by the local
producer make it a domestic product.
But, given enactment by the first mover, might not competition figure
into the legislation's proliferation because bar associations of the follower
states either experience loss of business to the prime mover or fear a poten-
tial loss of business? The first of these two suggestions presupposes: first,
no relaxation of our assumption of certain recognition of foreign LLCs and,
second, a somewhat stylized model of interest group activity. Recall the
sensitive cost-benefit profile of the bar's small-business customers. Given
this sensitivity, any firms unlikely to be deterred by the additional costs of
out-of-state-organization presumably already will be organized domestically
as Subchapter S corporations." Accordingly, no massive, state-wide loss
of business plausibly can be projected. A limited loss of business at the
state's borders is a more likely possibility." But such a projection literally
depends on the customer firm's geographical proximity to the border - the
proximity minimizes the firm's information costs and other transaction
costs. For this competitive causation story to work, information about such
border-town lost business must then diffuse to and motivate the actors in the
185. Out-of-state reorganization as an LLC is possible for such a firm, but such a step
would seem unlikely given any uncertainty as to domestic recognition.
186. See Ayres, supra note 13, at 375 (suggesting that Delaware might take close corpora-
tion business from Pennsylvania); Ribstein, supra note 144, at 400 (hypothesizing that Kansas
City, Missouri lawyers might lose LLC business to lawyers in Kansas City, Kansas).
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state bar who procure the legislation. 187 Such a scenario is not implausible,
although it works best where the border-town is itself a place of influence
in the state. 1m
Taken alone, the story's plausibility does not propel it to the top of the
list of likely causative factors in the proliferation of LLCs. After all, the
very fact of loss of business to a neighbor reinforces a projection of un-
tapped domestic demand. In addition, the overall risk of business loss to
the bar declines sharply once State E enacts an LLC statute. Recall that
State E stands in here for Delaware and that it is the custom for out-of-state
corporate lawyers to form Delaware corporations aid to give Delaware
opinions with the Delaware bar taking its special rents from litigating.
Thus, once State E has an LLC statute, a lawyer in State B, still lacking an
LLC statute, plausibly can compete with a cross-border lawyer in State A
by offering organization in State E to a firm client desiring LLC status. Of
course, with State E organization being more costly than domestic organiza-
tion, the State E alternative provides no basis for the realization of maxi-
mum LLC fee revenues by the State B bar. In this scenario, then, local
lawyers never need lose business to out-of-state lawyers. But local lawyers
nevertheless retain a powerful incentive to secure the enactment of domestic
legislation. Finally, we note a close and enervating tie between this sce-
nario and the assumption of certain foreign LLC recognition in non-LLC
states. If we relax the assumption and introduce uncertainty respecting
recognition of a State E LLC in State B, then, at least until t = 1, the State
E solution is suboptimal for both the State B lawyer and the client. The
implication of domestic causation in State B is proportionately strengthened.
But this lost business story can be restated so that it survives despite
the foregoing analysis. We simply say that risk-averse State B lawyers fear
lost business, even though on reflection they will see that no significant
amount of business actually need be lost. This less-pointed version of the
story is notably easy to tell. So long as even one firm might find it cost
beneficial to organize out of state and accept the risk of nonrecognition, it
will be plausible to say that the actors moving the bar association fear a loss
of the business. At this level of generality, a regulatory competition story
can indeed be included in the description of the proliferation of LLC statutes.
187. David A. Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U. L.
REv. 1, 52-60 (1985) (articulating such scenario in context of product safety standards).
188. Thus Ribstein places Kansas City in the story. Carney, supra note 149, at 859,
suggests that the cross-border business loss might be an influential fact even absent a business
center with a border location. He recalls a reference in a Georgia bar association committee
to south Georgia businesses crossing to Florida to organize as LLCs and speculates that similar
stories were told nationwide during the period of LLC proliferation.
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The high level of generality denudes the story of most of its descriptive
authority, however. Loss of business to another state is a constant possibil-
ity respecting business organizations in a federal system that does not
follow a rule of sige r~el. In such a system, the presence of out-of-state
alternatives acts as an intrinsic limit on the zone of any given state's law-
making discretion respecting business associations. No state enjoys a
natural monopoly."8 9 Furthermore, in the long run, a state refusing to
follow the LLC trend burdens its small firms with an extra level of costs,
and, given the long-term possibility of relocation of assets, may even
experience a loss of economic activity. But the fact of the projection and
the presence of out-of-state alternatives do not by themselves dictate the
conclusion that a particular body of law results from the competitive dispo-
sition of the state's legislature. In a world of interest group politics,
lawmakers' competitive incentives cannot be assumed. In order credibly
to draw on the background constant of interstate movement of individuals
and production factors in ascribing a competitive origin to particular legisla-
tion, therefore, incentives must be described with particularity. In the case
of LLCs, such a competitive description can be made with complete plausi-
bility on a domestic basis. The regulatory competition overlay amounts to
surplusage.
E. Summary - LLCs, Regulatory Competition, and
Evolutionary Efficiency
We conclude that regulatory competition can be accorded no more than
a secondary place in a plausible account of the proliferation of LLC stat-
utes. We can account completely for the fact of enactment by reference to
the financial incentives of the pertinent domestic interest group, the bar.
Between t = 0 and t = 1, the second-level causal contribution of regula-
tory competition at most concerns not the fact of adoption, but the timing
of adoption. Here, the particular point to be explained is the unusually
rapid action taken by bars and legislatures. As to this phenomenon, local
scare stories about business lost to lawyers in other states fits neatly into a
plausible causation story. But, remembering that money has a time value
and that local lawyers have fixed costs of operation to cover, local financial
incentives also must figure importantly in the explanation of the velocity of
enactment. After t = 1, certainty of foreign recognition triggers the special
incentives of the bar of State E so that a competitive posture respecting
189. Ribstein, supra note 144, at 400. As Ribstein points out, no state has the discre-
tion to raise its franchise taxes above a minimal, competitively set level. Id. at 399.
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LLC legislation becomes an active possibility. But no federation-wide
implication of competitive responsiveness thereby arises.
This account must be sharply distinguished from competing descrip-
tions of the LLC phenomenon that accord regulatory competition and
interest group politics co-equal status. 90 Those descriptions tend to be used
to support bottom-line efficiency assertions,' 9' for in theory regulatory
competition serves as a means to efficient ends. Unfortunately, however,
a pre-existing need to add support to a problematic efficiency assertion
imports no plausibility to a descriptive finding, whether of regulatory com-
petition or of anything else.
Even if there were some specific empirical evidence or a structural
factor that justified according regulatory competition a co-equal place in the
description of the proliferation of LLCs, support for an efficiency assertion
would not necessarily follow. Regulatory competition has a very precise
efficiency function: it promotes efficiency by causing citizen preferences to
be matched with legislative outcomes and, as a result, is held out as a cure
to the problem of legislative capture described in public choice theory.
Thus, the efficiency case for the LLC runs into a problem because interest
group influence figures prominently in all accounts of the proliferation of
LLC statutes. As a result, the exercise of admitting regulatory competition
to a co-equal place in the description literally says that competition here
serves the perverse function of hastening the rate of adoption of a piece of
interest group legislation! If we in addition make the above assumption that
LLC legislation causes an inefficient balance between loss externalization
and transaction cost reduction for small businesses, the inclusion of actual
or potential regulatory competition in the description implies a possible
lock-in of the inefficient result. 9 To see this possibility, hypothesize that
groups harmed by the adoption of an LLC statute organize politically in a
single state to attempt to bring about a roll back. Surely in the resulting
political contest the benefitted groups - lawyers and small business -
would plausibly counter that a single state cannot effectively take a unilat-
eral position against the trend in a competitive federal system.
Regulatory competition also has a second efficiency function: it pro-
motes efficiency by providing an incentive for innovation by junior level
190. See Macey, supra note 14, at 446-47 (arguing that states compete for chartering
revenues respecting LLCs); Ribstein, supra note 144, at 397 (asserting that LLCs "emerge
from a combination of political forces and jurisdictional competition").
191. Macey, supra note 14, at 442-43, 446-47; Ribstein, supra note 144, at 412.
192. We have made a parallel argument respecting public corporations. See Bratton &
McCahery, supra note 142, at 1885-90.
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governments. The LLC story strongly implies the presence of such an
incentive to innovate. First, the states have enacted these new statutes in
a short period of time, and second, the terms of the statutes they enact (or
amend) have changed during that short period of time so as to favor en-
hanced flexibility. 193 But can we take the existence of innovation, by itself,
as sufficient proof of efficient results? No, for given a strong rent-seeking
incentive on the part of a dominant interest group, a burst of regulatory (or
deregulatory) innovation may signal a deadweight loss to society. Can we
furthermore take the existence of innovation, by itself, as sufficient proof
of the presence of interstate competition? No, for innovation may be
prompted by domestic as well as interstate competitive incentives. With
LLCs, domestic rewards by themselves suffice to explain the close attention
paid by state lawmakers (and bar associations) to the terms of LLC statutes.
The lawyers seek a statute that provides maximum access to the group of
firms that otherwise would go into or remain in business in the partnership
form. Some trial and error in the achievement of that end is only to be
expected. Meanwhile, given that we are talking about small business, it
simply does not seem plausible to suggest that nuances in the terms of LLC
statutes cause a significant amount of LLC business to flow across state
lines. Although the possible appearance of a Delaware LLC "boutique"
directed to a small class of firms does, literally, modify the description, it
has no bearing on the description's policy implications.
F. Regulatory Competition and Producer Incentives
The foregoing discussion follows from the view that regulatory compe-
tition stories cannot be told on a black box basis that avoids inquiry into the
incentives of government actors. With regulation, self-interested production
does not necessarily imply product entrepreneurship. Governments, unlike
firms, do not labor under an immediate threat that bankruptcy results from
suboptimal decisionmaking. As a result, agency problems in the production
of public goods tend to be more substantial than those within firms.
Certainly, government actors sometimes act entrepreneurially. Pre-
sumably, this occurs when the tax revenues, export earnings, jobs, technol-
ogy, or other positive externalities yielded by the attraction of factors of
production also happen to yield appropriate political benefits, either in the
form of electoral advantage, satisfaction of the demands of favored interest
groups, or the satisfaction incident to enhancing public welfare.1" It is less
193. Ribstein, supra note 144, at 412-28.
194. Or, in the alternative, the particular factor cuts an advantageous deal directly with
the responsible government actors.
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certain that this incentive relationship can be assumed as a systematic prop-
osition. Indeed, where it does exist it can be ephemeral. Unlike firms,
which must hew to the profit incentive, the objectives of government
suppliers change over time with voter preferences.
The exercise of opening up regulatory competition's black box and
inquiring as to competitive incentives shows that special conditions tend to
obtain in those cases in which government entrepreneurship becomes
wrought into a lawmaking structure. Consider corporate charter competi-
tion in this regard. There we do see recognizable buyer-seller relation-
ships, but it also turns out that corporate charter competition is not a game
that every state can play. Significant competitive incentives do not show
up across the class of potential suppliers. Small jurisdictions tend to take
leading competitive roles: Delaware is the jurisdiction of incorporation of
about half of the corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
Similar conditions obtain in parallel cases of sale of juridical status - small
island-states tend to offer themselves as tax havens; Liberia, Panama, and
Greece lead in the registration of ships. The explanation prevailing for
Delaware probably applies across the board. Corporate franchise fees
amount to fifteen percent of Delaware's tax base; the same cash flow would
be a trivial percentage of the tax base of a large state. Given a limited
market, competitive success has a larger percentage impact on the smaller
government budget of a small jurisdiction. Political and financial incentives
to create (or to enter) a legal product market arise when such a significant
payoff is held out. The incentive relationship lends plausibility to the
product market in turn. The small jurisdiction's propensity to fiscal de-
pendence on its legal business provides a structural assurance that customer
interests will take precedence over all competing interests in local political
deliberations."9
Even when incentives to compete clearly are present, additional incen-
tive problems may inhibit the evolution of first-best legal products. Net-
work externality models,"9 for example, show that a demand-side problem
195. ROMANO, supra note 129, at 6-12. But even given such a clear-cut incentive in
favor of the interests of a given customer, integration with the rest of the federal system can
create complications. For instance, when enforcement is through private lawsuits, states do
not fully control their product because parties are free to sue elsewhere. See Hay, supra
note 162, at 652. In the corporate law context, this incident of federalism has complicated
Delaware's incentive picture. It must offer the plaintiffs bar sufficient returns to induce
litigation in the state while simultaneously maintaining a reputation for privileging the
interests of management. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 142, at 1898-1900.
196. For a survey of the literature, see generally Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
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can cause suboptimal equilibria to evolve and product innovation to be
choked off in situations of intense product competition. Supply-side prob-
lems also may arise. Product innovation presupposes an incentive to invest
in research and development. With industrial competitors, prospects of a
patent monopoly bolster the incentive. The patent deters entry by competi-
tors, assuring a potential return on investment in research and develop-
ment.1" Conversely, if an innovation easily can be copied by a rival, then
new technologies will not efficiently replace old technologies. Legal
innovation leads to the production of a public good and carries no patent
protection. Ian Ayres, applying this point to corporate law, suggests that
competing states will have insufficient incentives to invest the resources in
product innovation. 198 State legislatures will see no point in entering a race
to innovate if any resulting lead will be exhausted in a very short period of
time. Under this approach, the efficient rate of legal innovation will
depend on the probability of a state having the optimal degree of patent
protection.' 99 If the response to this suggestion is that legal innovations
intrinsically belong in the public domain, then law turns out to be quite
different from product.
Conclusion
Domestic incentives, taken alone, support a presumption that the LLC
is evolving so as to provide a cost-effective limited liability shell for small
firms. Any further conclusion respecting the development's overall effi-
ciency obviously depends on an absent factor - a clear-cut basis for
assuming that limited liability itself is efficient.
197. The basic patent model assumes that there is an optimal way of stimulating firms
to invest in research and development, which is deemed to be necessary for product
innovation. The patent prevents a rival from introducing a sufficiently close product, and
thus makes the rival's entrance into the market more costly. The patent will completely
deter such entrance under certain assumptions - for example, in a homogenous-goods
industry in which the monopolist is the only firm able to outbid the entrant to acquire the
innovation. See R. Gilbert & D. Newberry, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of
Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 514, 524-25 (1982). See generally John Vickers, Concepts
of Competition, 47 OxFoRD ECON. PAPERS 1 (1995). But patentability does not by itself
foreclose entrance into the product area.
198. Ayres, supra note 178, at 241-46.
199. Ayres also suggests that an especially fast race between states will result in rent
dissipation. Id. at 246-51. In this leader-follower model of entry deterrence, if only the
leader state adopts the new technology, it receives all the profits from the innovation. But
the rents decrease if imitators can free ride. The larger the spillover to competitors, the
larger the incentive problem. See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 400 (1988).
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